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PREFACE 
In memoriam Eduardo White 
This report presents the results of a multicountry research project aimed at 
understanding the phenomenon of the international transfer of technology to developing 
countries by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) based in developed countries. The 
study, which was supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of 
Canada, was coordinated by the Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo y Relaciones Econ6micas 
Internacionales (CEDREI), Buenos Aires, and benefitted from the contributions of 12 
research collaborators in both the transferring and recipient countries. 
From its very beginning the research project was conceived and promoted by 
Eduardo White, Director of CEDREI at the rime. In fact, White devoted many years of his 
academic career to the study of the internationalization of SMEs, and was the responsible 
of carrying out the first phase of this IDRC-funded project (White and Campos 1986). He 
selected the team of 12 researchers that worked on the present survey, and organized their 
three meetings in Nuremberg, Montreal and Buenos Aires. These gatherings were extremely 
useful for improving the accuracy of the research approach as well as for the carrying out 
of the field work, and for the discussion of the main findings that came out from the 
different country studies (the respective papers are included in other two volumes: CEDREI 
1990 Vols. I and Il). Furthermore, prior to his death White was also responsible for 
previous drafts of certain sections of the present report. 
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For those of us who had the privilege of working during many years side by side 
with him on this line of research, his disappearance was a great blow. His enthusiasm, 
sharp mind, auto-criticism and deep respect for his colleagues points of view made the 
daily experience of sharing a research endeavor with him an extraordinary gratifying as 
well as joyful adventure. 
It is a satisfaction then for us to dedicate this report to his memory. 
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Thousands of small and meclium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with headquarters in 
developed countries have carried out, in the last decades, production operations in 
foreign countries. A not insignificant number of these initiatives have been implemented 
in developing countries (White and Campos 1986 and Fujita 1990). Notwithstanding, 
its proper to say that as a whole their presence has been largely unnoticed by scholars 
and government officiais. 
To a certain extent this neglect has to do with the fact that a priori the study of 
the intemationalization of SMEs appears as a rather odd subject of analysis. That is, at 
the light of most of the received literature on the foreign expansion of firms, only large 
undertakings are considered to be in a position to embark in production projects in 
foreign countries. Smaller firms, on the contrary, have been viewed,traditionally, as 
agents for which there is no other proper environment to operate in than the one of their 
local, or at most national market. The reason is at first sight quite straightforward: the 
establishment and management of a production venture in a foreign country requires on 
the part of the firms involved the possession of significant resources which are 
considered to be out of reach for SMEs. 
Is with this background in mind that this Introduction is organized. First, it refers 
to the antecedents of this subject of study. Through them its possible to shed some 
light on the main points of view and interests of the research carried out up to now. 
Second, a look at the received literature on international production and its relevance 
for SMEs intemationalization will be advanced. This presentation will help to capture 
some of the more crucial features of the latter process. Finally, a word on the contents 
of the present study will be put forward. 
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1. Sorne research antecedents 
a) Three broad viewpoints 
The studies carried out so far on the internationalization of SMEs can be 
conveniently grouped in three categories according to their main emphasis. The first 
ones have dealt with "push" factors of a macroeconomic nature. Research carried out 
by the end of the seventies in certain European countries and Japan is a case in point. 
The main preoccupation in Europe at the time had to do with the restructuring 
process. In fact, during that period, in those countries there was a growing awareness 
about the challenge to the competitiveness of certain industrial branches generated by 
the rise in real wages. In addition, there was a clear perception that the loss of 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries was an structural phenomenon. That 
is, the main thrust those days was that those industrialized countries had to prepare 
themselves for loosing out the capacity of producing certain goods which accounted for 
a large utilization of labor inputs per unit of output. Furthermore, their was a clear 
recognition that the natural expected path was for those industries to move to those 
locations in which labor was a relatively more abundant resource. Developing countries 
appeared, of course, as the natural environment for those activities. 
UNIDO's reports conducted in Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland (See UNIDO 
1978, 1979a and 1979b) and Halbach and Bohnet's (1976) one on the Federal Republic 
of Germany, based on surveys to a wide array of firms from different industries, sought 
to :find out their interest in transferring productive resources to developing countries. 
The common conclusion of all of them was that redeployment appeared as a more 
attractive possibility for firms in labor intensive industries, but it was in relation with 
small and medium sized enterprises that the potential of operating abroad emerged as 
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particularly attractive. In other words, those reports emphasized the strong correlation 
found between industries that were experiencing a restructuring process and the 
important presence in them of smaller undertakings. 
Kojima (1977) and Ozawa (1979) studied the process of intemationalization of 
J apanese firms and verified that contrary to what was expected from the received 
literature based on the U.S., and to a less extent European experience, the former 
phenomenon was largely the result of deep macroeconomic changes experienced by the 
domestic economy. More precisely, both authors reckoned, that the significant rise in 
real wages in J apan coupled with the appreciation of the Yen, operated as very strong 
incentives for firms in labor-intensive industries to move to nearby Asian countries 
where costs of that factor of production were a fraction of those in J apan. 
The interesting observation of both scholars was that J apanese foreign 
manufacturing investments were carried out by firms placed in competitive industries 
that produced relatively simple, standardized, traditional goods; and that the common 
feature of those enterprises was that most of them were of small or medium size. In 
other words, they demonstrated that in the J apanese experience overseas ventures were 
to a significant extent the result of SMEs moving away from an unattractive 
macroeconomic environment to countries with endowments more in line with their 
competitive advantages. 
A second approach followed by some scholars has paid special attention to the 
role performed by industry as well as firm specific variables. Among others, Kohn's 
thesis (1988), probably one of the most significant efforts in the field, showed that U.S. 
SMEs that invested abroad - in tune with much of the received literature - tended 
to be established in high growth-R&D intensive industries. But he also found that in 
contrast with the typical pattern depicted for large transnational corporations, SMEs that 
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got involved in foreign operations were not established in industries - such as the ones 
that manufacture consumer goods - in which brand names represented an important 
ownership advantage. 
Other studies have shown that SMEs carry out foreign operations in order to 
maintain their presence in overseas markets previously supplied through exports. The 
German (Kumar and Steinman 1990) and Italian (Onida 1985) experiences are at this 
respect very revealing, since the referred undertakings established in them are highly 
geared towards exports. The decision by them of transferring productive resources 
abroad appears in many cases as a second best option to assure a presence in a given 
country that can not be reached otherwise. 
In what has been labelled the "second wave" of Japanese SMEs investments 
abroad, firms of this nationality appear in recent years to have put to work a strategy 
according to which they gradually displace to foreign locations the manufacturing of 
relatively more simpler products and continue to produce at home (in contrast with what 
was usual in the ":first" wave) those of higher complexity (Ozawa 1985). This behavior 
matches the one by large transnational corporations and suggests that SMEs can adopt 
increasingly sophisticated modes in their overseas involvement. 
Finally, a third category of studies have emphasized what can be called "pull" 
factors - that is stemming from the recipient countries themselves - in order to 
explain SMEs international operations. In fact, Ouane (1986), Bell and Scott-Kemmis 
(1988), and White and Campos (1986), have showed that a significant number of the 
latter experiences were to a large extent feasible due to the crucial role performed by 
host country firms in the process. The data from these studies indicates conclusively 
that were those undertakings that contacted the SMEs the ones carried out much of the 
main activities necessary to make the technology transfer possible. Furthermore, without 
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the existence of complementary resources (technical and otherwise) contributed by 
them, SMEs originated know hows would not have been imported and assimilated. 
b) The view from the South: SMEs as alternative sources of productive resources 
By the end of the seventies, scholars in developing countries were back from a 
period characterized for a great criticism of the behavior of large transnational 
corporations, and were increasingly moved by their interest in looking for new agents 
that could be taken into consideration to derive from them needed productive assets. 
It was in the context of this motivation that UNCT AD asked E. White to produce a 
report on the role that SMEs could perform in the international transfer of technology 
to developing countries. White's paper stands out clearly as the most complete 
statement regarding those dimensions of SMEs that a priori were considered at the time 
to be of particular interest from the point of view of developing countries. 
According to the referred author (White 1980), those were: 
i) technologies controlled by SMEs were considered to be more appropriate to 
developing countries endowments, given the more frequent use by these undertakings 
(relatively to large firms) of labor intensive techniques. In addition, the hypothesis was 
that SMEs know hows were probably more simple to operate and that the fact that they 
were associated with the manufacturing of smaller production runs, made them more 
adaptable to the small market conditions of most developing countries; 
ii) given their lack of resources and of experience in operating in foreign 
markets, SMEs were viewed as necessarily more inclined to accept a larger participation 
of host country firms in their ventures abroad. This preference went hand in hand with 
the strong motivation at the tiine on the part of developing countries for allowing their 
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own domestic firms to have a relevant participation in projects with foreign investors. 
An involvement of the former undertakings was considered as a useful mechanism to 
allow them to assimilate the skills transferred and to minimize the negative balance of 
payments effects normally associated with wholly owned subsidiaries. 
iii) the fact that by definition SMEs control limited resources and that the 
projects in which they may participate in developing countries would be of relatively 
smaller size, entailed that the probability of they emerging as powerful agents with 
strong political clout on their own, vis a vis host country governments was low. This 
was of course viewed as a very important feature of these enterprises inasmuch as in 
many developing countries their was at the time a strong mistrust of large corporations 
dealings with local governments. 
As it would be evident throughout this study, in due time some of the features 
of SMEs signalled out by White were not to be backed by his own research as well as 
by that conducted by other scholars. But no doubt his provocative report influenced 
other colleagues and established to a great extent the agenda on the topic of what were 
to be the following research efforts supported by IDRC,UNCTAD as well as by other 
organizations. 
2. The received theory and SMEs intemationalization 
In the standard theory of international production firms move abroad move 
abroad because they possess certain competitive advantages. This fact puts them in a 
better position vis a vis domestic firms in the recipient market. Without the control of 
those attributes those firms would not surpass the obstacles normally associated with 
an overseas engagement. Typically two main types of assets are here worth referring. 
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The first one has to do with tangible assets such as financial resources. That is, 
finns that are capable of mobilizing those assets are better suited to operate in foreign 
markets. The ones that traditionally face constraints at this respect, - typically 
SMEs - are considered agents with low chances to participate in such ventures. As 
Horst (1972) has put it, "investing abroad may entai! certain fixed costs which must be 
incurred if any foreign production is to occur. Because larger finns are often considered 
to be better credit risks than small finns, large finns may have an easier time :financing 
the fixed costs entailed in investing abroad". 
But the above mentioned statement is based on the assumption that the 
population of SMEs is homogeneous. That ail finns of that size face the same 
constraints and are in an equal footing when it cornes to their capacity to mobilize the 
financial resources needed to go ahead with a production venture in a foreign country. 
In this vein, it is appropriate to indicate that the studies conducted on SMEs which have 
actually participated in those initiatives, demonstrate that certainly the most common 
finding is not that ail types of SMEs have an equal share of those ventures. On the 
contrary, the overall tendency has been to verify that relatively stronger finns - and, 
thus, presumably with better access to credit - have been more frequently involved in 
foreign production operations. 
The above comment should not be viewed as implying that SMEs, including 
those that are in a stronger relative position, do no tend to face larger obstacles at the 
time of mobilizing the needed assets than large firms. For example, the lack of 
sufficient managerial resources is an important barrier that SMEs face when trying to 
asses a given opportunity and at the time of actually operating in overseas markets 
through production activities. In fact, for these finns, it is not easy to find ways to 
replace the local personnel moved overseas, or to overview the foreign venture' s 
operations. As Buckley and Mirza (1990) have put it," small finns do not often have 
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specialist executives to manage their international operations, nor do they possess a 
hierarchy of managers through which complex decisions can be sifted". 
But modem approaches have emphasized the relevance of the ownership of 
intangible assets as the main factors explaining the intemationalization of firms. 
Dunning (1983), for example, has contended that is the control of firm-specific 
resources that put multinational enterprises at an advantage vis a vis their competitors. 
Among the latter, no doubt the capabilities of those firms to master certain technologies 
has been viewed as a particularly crucial feature. 
By and large, the referred argument can also be applied to SMEs. In fact, as it 
will be underlined in a next Chapter, those SMEs that have got involved in production 
operations abroad (in this case in developing countries), have pursued R&D efforts 
usually above what could be considered the average of their industry. In other words 
these firms appear also to control certain know hows that allow them to control a given 
advantage when competing in foreign markets. 
But the main thrust of the received literature, strongly flavored by the experience 
of large U .S. firms, has been up to now to emphasize the control of technologies based 
in the exploitation of scale economies and of product differentiation through significant 
advertising and marketing efforts. In other words, the possession of other intangible 
assets by a firm. was not usually considered to be a relevant feature inasmuch as they 
were not viewed as decisive at the time of explaining their overseas involvement. 
In particular, the fact that smaller firms may posses ownership advantages 
derived from their control of very specific know hows, related with the production of 
goods targeted to satisfy a very limited and, usually sophisticated demand, has not been 
considered. More so, that smaller firms producing custom made goods could be in a 
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competitive position when operating abroad was not easily accepted in the framework 
of theories that assumed that firms that specialized in manufacturing goods tailored to 
a given local demand, would not be particularly suited to move overseas. 
What the received theories did not foresee, was the fact that a firm - typically 
an SME - specialized in a very specific market niche, would be inclined to operate 
abroad as an appropriate strategy to maintain its leading position in a given product 
line. More so, the deeper the commitment of the firm to innovational efforts at its very 
specific field, the more constraints it will face to operate only in its domestic market. 
As Gomes Casseres and Kohn (1990) have convincingly put forward, as specialization 
deepens, SMEs gain from moving overseas. This strategy, in addition, allows them to 
extend their overall volume of activity and derive a larger income from which they can 
support their increasingly critical R&D efforts. 
As Cantwell (1988) has correctly emphasized, in the literature on multinational 
firms ownership advantages have been confused to often with monopolistic advantages, 
following the terminology used by market power approach theorists. No doubt this 
confusion has helped to put aside the study of SMEs as agents that participate in the 
intemationalization process, since these undertakings are not, normally, in a position to 
hold those type of features. When instead, the foreign involvement of :firms is looked 
upon as the result of monopolistic competition and rivalry among firms that can be 
more appropriately de:fined as oligopolists, then there is much that can be derived from 
the literature to illuminate SMEs drive towards overseas operations. 
In fact, Kohn (1988), Bertin (1986), and others have shown that SMEs that 
invest abroad tend to control a large share of the home country markets in which they 
operate. These findings are, admittedly, related with a narrowly defined concept of 
industry. In other words they usually correspond to speci:fic product lines rather than to 
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whole branches. Notwithstanding, and in tenns of their actual business behavior, this 
fact entails that these finns command a relatively leading position and as a consequence 
are in a position of controlling certain specific assets that albeit their small absolute size 
allow them to plunge into foreign production ventures. 
According to product cycle theories (V emon 1966), innovating firms first export 
their goods to foreign markets and then, when the products they manufacture enter into 
a phase of increasing standardization, they set up production abroad as a means to be 
in a better competitive position vis a vis low cost producers. These theories are 
structured under the hypothesis that as time elapses the cost of producing a given 
product tend to diminish as a result of an increased utilization of manufacturing 
techniques with significant scale economies. 
From the evidence so far obtained its possible to state, that in fact in some 
instances the referred theories can also help to understand the intemationalization of 
SMEs. For example, Ozawa (1985) in his study on Japanese S:MEs that moved to 
nearby Asian countries, emphasizes that one of the motives for them to carry out that 
decision had to do with their preference for manufacturing abroad those products that 
could be fabricated through relatively more standardized methods. But its obvious that 
for S:MEs dedicated to the production of custom-made goods that have decided to 
operate abroad, an interpretation based on the above features is not entirely appropriate. 
Among the approaches that have been developed to interpret why finns decide 
to get involved in production operations in foreign countries, the theory of market 
internalisation has received wide attention (Buckley and Casson 1971). This body of 
literature would predict that smaller finns have less reasons to adopt equity controlled 
fonns than non-equity fonns of international involvement. The higher risks associated 
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with the former and the diffi.culties inherent in managing a foreign affi.liate would deter 
Sl\IBs from adopting that organizational mode. 
But the evidence gathered so far indicates that many Sl\IBs particularly when 
they happen to take the decision in an "autonomous" manner (that is, when they are not 
approached by a recipient firm with a given project), prefer to use equity controlled 
forms in their foreign operations. Through them the need to formalize their know hows 
is reduced and the burden of coordination between affi.liate and parent firm is eased, 
since typically these firms prefer to manage their overseas affi.liates (which normally 
are a small number) as a division of the parent company. 
3. Contents of the report 
The first objective of this report is to characterize those Sl\IBs that have 
participated in the experiences of technology transfer to the six selected developing 
countries. More specifically, in Chapter Il, the main features of Sl\IBs are presented as 
well as their international expansion experience. Data on their absolute sizes, relative 
position in their respective industries and technological behavior allow to grasp some 
of the structural forces at work that operate to explain their drive towards overseas 
markets. The previous international involvement and the basic patterns followed at this 
respect are also analyzed. 
Sl\IBs participate in the studied ventures through equity as well as non-equity 
forms. Chapter III deepens into the factors that explain the preferences of those firms 
for one or another mode, and also sheds light on the restrictions that these firms face 
at this respect. Any of the organizational modes selected is strongly determined by the 
nature of the .know hows actually transferred by Sl\IBs and by the channels used. In 
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order to understand the characteristics of the latter, an analysis is advanced in Chapter 
IV. More precisely, the evidence on the contents of the technologies transmitted by 
SMEs to developing countries and the utilization of particular mechanisms such as blue 
prints and technical assistance is put forward. 
Of special interest for developing countries is the issue of the adaptability of 
SMEs technological assets. This is the main focus of Chapter V, where the data on the 
extent of prior adaptation and the degree of the efforts carried out at this respect is 
presented. Chapter VI, on its part, deals with the issue of the significant role performed 
by domestic initiative-taking firms in allowing the transfer of technology from SMEs 
to take place. 
Finally, the last Chapter tackles the topic of the policy measures that home and 
host countries could device to promote an increased utilization by the latter of the 
resources controlled by SMEs. This efforts would allow developing countries to have 
access to a virtually untapped reservoir of technical resources that can be putto work, 
in many instances, to the benefit of them. 
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CHAPTER I 
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
The purpose of this section is to present the different methodological aspects 
which characterize this research effort, in order for the reader to gain a precise idea of 
the unit of analysis of the study as well as of the special features of the empirical 
survey that was conducted. Given the complexities of the research topic as well as of 
the procedures followed to identify and select the cases studied, the need for a detailed 
methodological presentation at the outset is crucial for the understanding of what cornes 
below. Thus, the reader is strongly urged to go through this section before reading what 
cornes next. 
1. The concept of SME 
A crucial aspect of this research has to do with the definition adopted as to what 
is considered to be a small or medium sized firm. It is obvious that size is a tricky 
concept inasmuch as a firm may be considered a small firm according to a certain 
feature and be labelled as a medium-sized firm or even a large firm when looked from 
a somewhat different perspective. A typical situation arises, for example, when criteria 
based on number of employees is used together with one on market share. It is clear 
that a firm may be considered small in one count - let's say because it has a work 
force of less than 100 employees - but on the other hand control a significant 
proportion of the market of a given industry narrowly defined. 
It is also evident that firms which following certain parameters such as sales 
could be considered small in terms of, for example, the U.S. market, would be classified 
as large when compared with the typical firm established in other countries with a much 
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smaller domestic market. In fact, as it will be referred below, this explains why the 
criteria used by some U.S. governmental institutions includes size categories which 
surpass the ceilings typically used by their counterparts in other industrialized countries. 
What is true at the country level can be extended also to the industry level. Finns 
whose size measured by, say assets, are viewed as small in a capital intensive industry 
would normally be looked as large firms in a highly labor intensive manufacturing 
sector. 
The above comments are, of course, also applicable when, as in this report, firms 
are studied in so far as they transfer technology overseas (in this case, to developing 
countries). From the received literature we know that the participation of a firm in a 
venture in a foreign country entails the commitment of resources which are usually less 
abundant in a small firm. This is particularly the case when firms carry out direct 
investments abroad since this mode of operation requires the transfer of financial, 
technological and managerial skills, all of them "assets" that are in short supply in small 
or medium sized firms. This explains why when it has corne to analyze the phenomenon 
of foreign direct investment, the great majority of scholars have equated that subject of 
research with the study of the behavior of large transnational corporations, since only 
this type of firms are considered to be in a position to carry out those operations. 
With these considerations in mind, it was considered necessary in this study to 
corne up with a very clear eut indicator of size which would be based on an accepted 
and well known criteria. Three main possibilities existed. The first one would be to 
establish our own working definition on the basis of some statistical observation. For 
example, taking into account the size distribution of all firms in each country and 
coming up with a certain classification. The other - related with our object of study 
- would be to analyze the size distribution of firms that operate abroad in order to 
proceed to suggest significant categories. Both possibilities had their shortcomings. The 
former required information on firms - and not only on establishments - which was 
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not available for all countries. The latter was only partially available for the U.S. and 
J apan and thus, could not be used for the other countries. A third possibility was to 
select those definitions used in each country by govern.mental institutions that in one 
way or another have to do with SME's. In fact, for all the seven developed countries 
included in this study some official definitions exist as to what should be considered 
an SME. Those statements are constructed taking into consideration the pattern of 
employment as the main criteria, although in some countries also other variables are 
used to establish the referred definition. Table 1 includes a presentation of these 
different criteria. 
Taking into account those antecedents, and having in mind the need of using in 
this study a simple working definition, an SME was considered to be a firm that in its 
home country had up to 500 employees. This criteria is similar to the one most 
frequently followed by governmental institutions in the seven countries - although the 
corresponding figure is smaller than the one used in the U.S. and higher than the one 
employed in Japan - and is easier to use than other measures. 
No doubt this chosen definition is extremely restrictive. In fact, since the object 
of study of this research is the internationalization of firm's productive activities, it 
could well be appropriate to use a much higher ceiling regarding firm's size. It should 
be recalled that the "standard" transnational corporation which is the focus of much of 
the literature on international business frequently employs thousands of persons in its 
home country alone. 
It is also important to indicate, that in order to be included in this survey and be 
considered an SME, a firm had also to be an independent finn. That is, a finn that as 
far as could be gauged from the interviews, was not controlled by another firm or 












Official criteria used by selected developed countries to define manufacturing SMEs. 
Upper Ceilings 
Category Use Employees Turnover Assets 
Small Statistical 100 
Small Financing $2m. Can. 
Medium Statistical $20m. Can. 
Small Statistical 50 
Medium Statistical 200 ...................... 
Medium S tatistical 500 ...................... 
Medium Statistical Ff 50m. 
Small General 50 Dm2m. 
Medium General 500 dm25 m. 
S.M.E Financing 500 1. 3000M. 
S.M.E General 300 y lOOm. 
Small Statistical 200 
Medium Statistical 1000 
Small Statistical 500 
Lo ans 250-1500 
Procurement 500-1500 
Investment 




Small Business Act 
Foundries & metal industries, mechanical 
industry, building materials, textiles, paper, 
cardboard and graphie industries. 
All other manufacturing industries. 
Sources: 
Confederation Generale des Petites et 
Moyennes Enterprises. 
French Economie and Social Committee. 
Qualitative criteria: 
- Do not as a rule borrow in the capital 
markets. 
- Run independently by persons working 
on their own account, who are directly 
involved in the work, and bear ail the 
risks. 
Source: Bundestag-drucksache VI/1666. 
Source: Leggi sui Finanziamento. 
Source: S.M.E. Fundamental Law. 
Qualitative Criteria: 
- Small share of the market 
- Managed by its owners. 
- Does not form part of a larger enterprise. 
Source: Small Finns Division. Department 
of Jndustry. 
Qualitative Criteria: 
- lndependently owned and operated. 
- Not dominant in its field of operation. 
- Characteristics of the industry. 
Sources: 
Small Business Administration. 
Small Business Act 
2. Sample selection 
As referred in the Introduction, the field work for this study, was carried out in 
six developing and seven developed countries. Suppliers of technology, that is SMEs 
- were interviewed in the latter while the same was done with recipient firms in the 
former countries. The procedure to identify and select fi.rms to be studied consisted in: 
i) The team of researchers under the coordination of CEDREI agreed to 
circumscribe to a given set of industries the cases of technology transfer to be studied. 
Specifically, only cases from the chemical and allied products, textiles, paper, and 
porcelain, metal products, machinery, electric and electronic equipment, measuring 
equipment, optical equipment and transportation equipment industries were selected. 
ii) It was agreed that each country researcher would try as much as possible to 
elaborate its sample in a way that a variety of cases from different industries, different 
countries of origin or destination of the technology transf er and different organizational 
forms to transfer know hows would be included. 
iii) Researchers from developing countries obtained from official sources lists of 
foreign firms which had exported technologies to their countries related to the above 
mentioned industries. This information was forwarded to developed country researchers. 
It is important to indicate that the nature of the lists was not equal for all six developing 
countries. In fact, in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Korea and Mexico, data was 
available regarding foreign firms which had carried out investments as well as in 
relation to foreign fi.rms which had licensed their technology. For Singapore the basic 
information available had to do only with foreign investments, while for India only data 
regarding technical collaborations was at hand. This differences have mainly to do with 
the nature of the institutional setting which regulates the import of technology in these 
six countries. 
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iv) Researchers in the seven developed countries went through the referred lists 
in order to identify the size as well as the "independence" of the :firm.s established in 
them which had transferred technology to some of the above mentioned developing 
countries. This task was performed using secondary information contained in industry 
directory's. The names of the SMEs which were identified in those lists were 
communicated to CEDRE! and to the corresponding developing country researchers. 
v) The latter researchers assembled all the information on cases with SME 
involvement and constructed an "indicative sample" which was in turn communicated 
to CEDRE!. From this Centre suggestions were in turn made as to ways to correct those 
samples in order to take into account as far as possible the need to balance the 
industries included, the countries of origin and the organizational form of the ventures. 
With this guidance, developing country researchers went on to interview recipient :firm.s. 
Once the agreed number of cases was covered, the relevant data as well as a copy of 
the questionnaires was sent to CEDRE!. 
vi) With the information on the cases interviewed in the South, developed 
country researchers went on to carry out their own interviews. Their target was to try 
as much as possible to get in touch with the same SME whose technology transfer 
experience was already looked at from the perspective of its recipient partner (be it a 
subsidiary, a joint venture, or a licensee). This objective proved to be very difficult to 
attain. In fact, in contrast with most developing country cases - which were 
concentrated (with the exception of lndia) in one or two large metropolitan areas - the 
SMEs to be interviewed were widely spread over the territory of the developed 
countries considered, and as a consequence, it was impossible taking into account the 
resources available to the researchers, to match all interviews made previously in 
developing countries. 
vii) ln the end, and after excluding a series of interviews which did not fit the 
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criteria of this study - that is, suppliers were larger than expected or were subsidiaries 
of large undertakings, no technology transfer was really made, the operation was not 
related to manufacturing know hows, etc. - a total of 114 cases were selected. The 
data on them was derived from 72 interviews carried out in the industrialized countries 
and 76 performed in the six recipient countries. In 34 cases, the supplier as well as the 
recipient corresponding to the same technology transfer experience were interviewed. 
3. Sample description 
The empirical evidence in which this study is based consists of 114 cases of 
technology transfer from 106 SMEs (7 SMEs were protagonists of transfers to more 
than one of the recipient countries). The following tables present the distribution of 
cases by countries of origin and recipient countries, industrial sectors, forms of 
involvement and time period of the operations. 
Table 2 indicates that India is the recipient country with the largest number of 
cases, followed by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and Korea. In terms of the 
countries of origin of the projects, United States technology suppliers are strongly 
concentrated in Mexico, and secondly in Brazil; Canada and the U .K., in lndia; France 
in Mexico; ltaly in Argentina; and Japan in Singapore; while German SMEs are more 
evenly distributed among the 6 recipient countries, except for Singapore. These 
combinations reflect to some extent historical patterns of geographical orientation of 
direct investments and technology transfers from those developed countries to the six 
selected developing countries. 
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Table 2 
Case studies of technology transfer, by source and recipient countries. 




countries Canada France German y ltaly Japan U.K. u.s. Total figures 
Argentina 3% 25% 29% 56% 11% 18% 20 
Brazil 13% 13% 24% 17% 6% 28% 16% 18 
In dia 47% 13% 18% 17% 63% 27% 31 
Korea 17% 6% 6% 14% 13% 11% 11% 12 
Mexico 10% 38% 18% 44% 15% 17 
Singapore 10% 13% 6% 6% 86% 19% 6% 14% 16 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Absolute figures 30 8 17 18 7 16 18 114 
It is important to underline that these "semi-industrialized" countries have very 
different features. From the start (see Table 3) they include the second most populated 
country in the world - lndia - together with a small "city-state" - Singapore -
which has only 2.4 million inhabitants. In addition, their total GNP, as well as per 
capita income also differs, and the same can be said with respect to their economic 
growth performance. More so, while some are relatively open economies - Singapore 
again - others are (lndia) or have been (the three Latin Americans) in the period in 
which the studied experiences were implemented, relatively closed economies. In the 
same vein, the stability or instability of the economic climate (proxied in Table 3 by the 
evolution of consumer prices) has also varied strongly among them. The referred 
variable, coupled with the institutional setting vis a vis inflows of foreign direct 
investment and/or imports of arms-length technology, is very significant at the time of 
understanding the steps taken by SMEs and recipient firms with regard to the 
transfer/acquisition of technology. 
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Table 3 
Sorne basic indicators of recipient developing countries. 
Argentina Brazil India Korea Mexico Singapore 
Population (millions) 1980 28 118 675 38 69 2.4 
GNP (billions U$D) 1965 16 19 60 3 22 1 
GNP (billions U$D) 1980 72 255 153 57 138 11 
GNP (billions U$D) 1988 79 323 238 171 177 24 
GNP average annual growth 1965-80 3.5 8.8 3.6 9.6 6.5 10.1 
GNP average annual growth 1980-88 -0.2 2.9 5.2 9.9 0.5 5.7 
GNP per capita average annual growth 1965-88 0 3.6 1.8 6.8 2.3 7.2 
GNP per capita 1980 (U$D) 2590 2160 230 1500 1980 4400 
GNP per capita 1988 (U$D) 2520 2160 340 3600 1760 9070 
Average annual rate of inflation 1965-80 78.2 31.5 7.5 18.7 13.0 4.9 
Average annual rate of inflation 1980-88 290.5 188.7 7.4 5.0 73.8 1.2 
Adult literacy rate 1985 95% 78% 43% 90% 86% 
Percent of manufacturing in the GDP 1965 33 26 16 18 20 15 
Percent of manufacturing in the GDP 1988 31 29 19 32 26 30 
Percent of experts in the GDP 1965 8 8 4 9 8 123 
Percent of experts in the GDP 1988 10 10 7 41 16 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1990. 
Table 4 reflects the industry profile of the sarnple. Non-electrical machinery, 
chemicals, and electro-electronic equipment, in that order, are the three main sectors in 
terms of number of technology transfer operations. The machinery sector is 
overwhelming in Brazil (71 % of the cases) and is highly represented in lndia; chemicals 
are slightly above the average in Mexico, Singapore, Argentina and Brazil; electro-
electronic projects stand out in the Singapore sarnple; metal products have a significant 
share in Mexico; transport equipment cases predominate in Korea, and scientific and 
measurement equipment have some significance in Singapore. 
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Table 4 
lndustry distribution of technology transfer cases by recipient countries. 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Non Scientific/ 
Recipient Meta! electric Electric/ measur. Transport. Abs. 
countries Chemicals products machinery electronic equipment equipment Other Total fig. 
Argentin a 20o/o 10% 35% 25% 5% 5% lOOo/o 20 
Brazil 17% 6% 72% 6% lOOo/o 18 
India 13% 6% 42% 13% 10% 10% 6% 100% 31 
Korea 17% 25% 25% 25% 8% lOOo/o 12 
Mexico 35% 24% 24% 12% 6% 100% 17 
Singapore 19% 13% 25% 25% 19% lOOo/o 16 
Total 19% 10% 39% 16% 8% 6% 3% lOOo/o 
Abs. fig. 22 11 44 18 9 7 3 114 
Finally, it is worth mentioning, that the majority of the studied cases were 
implemented from 1976-1985 although important differences existed at this respect 
among recipient countries. While Indian and Korean ventures were carried out 
mainly from 1980 onwards, most of Brazilian initiatives corresponded to the decade 
of the seventies. Ralf of the cases with Argentina as host country corresponded to 
1976-1980. For the rest, cases are more widely split through a larger period of time 
(see Table 5). 
Table 5 
Time periods of the technology transfer operations by recipient countries. 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Recipient 
countries Till 1970 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 After 1985 Total Abs. fig. 
Argentina 10% 5% 50% 20% 15% 100% 20 
Brazil 17% 44% 17% 17% 6% 100% 18 
India 3% 6% 3% 61% 26% 100% 31 
Korea 8% 8% 67% 17% 100% 12 
Mexico 24% 35% 12% 29% 100% 17 
Singapore 6% 25% 38% 25% 6% 100% 16 
Total 10% 19% 20% 38% 13% 100% 
Abs. fig. 11 22 23 43 15 114 
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CHAPTER Il 
MAIN FEATURES OF STUDIED SMEs 
This Chapter presents on the one hand some basic features of sample SMEs such 
as their size, industry, relative position in their domestic markets and technological 
behavior. On the other, the export performance of those firms and some basic traits of 
their international production expansion are put forward. 
A. BASIC TRAITS 
1. Size, location and industry 
As set forth in the previous Chapter, the criteria adopted to classify sample 
SMEs was the number of employees. According toit for the whole 106 cases studied, 
the average size was of 228 employees per firm. In most cases (66%), however, 
companies with no more than 300 employees were involved, while the remaining 34% 
included companies with up to 500 employees (see Table 6). With respect to annual 
sales, another indicator of size, the average for the sample was 34 million dollars. 
Following this parameter, minor firms prevail too. As a matter of fact, only 27% of the 
sample recorded sales of over 50 million dollars a year, while out of the remaining 
73%, half recorded sales revenues of less than 10 million dollars a year (see Table 7). 
In addition, its worth indicating that 86% of the firms were family owned. 
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Table 6 
Sample SMEs classified by number of employees and home country. 
Number of employees 
Home 
5-100 101-300 301-500 Total 
country Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % 
Canada 14 52% 9 33% 4 15% 27 100% 
France 1 13% 3 38% 4 50% 8 100% 
Germany 3 23% 5 38% 5 38% 13 100% 
ltaly 5 28% 8 44% 5 28% 18 100% 
Japan 2 29% 5 71% 7 100% 
U.K. 5 33% 4 27% 6 40% 15 100% 
U.SA. 2 11% 9 50% 7 39% 18 100% 
Total 30 28% 40 38% 36 34% 106 100% 
Table 7 
Sample SMEs classified by annual sales and home country. 
Annual sales (mill U$s) 
<1 1-5 5-10 10-25 25-50 >=50 Total 
Home 
counuy Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % Abs.fig. % 
Canada 5 19% 5 19% 6 23% 6 23% 4 15% 26 100% 
France 1 17% 2 33% 2 33% 1 17% 6 100% 
German y 10% 3 30% 2 20% 2 20% 2 20% 10 100% 
ltaly 11% 5 56% 3 33% 9 100% 
Japan 1 20% 20% 3 60% 5 100% 
U.K. 8% 2 17% 5 42% 4 33% 12 100% 
U.S.A. 7% 2 14% 5 36% 7% 5 36% 14 100% 
Total 5 6% 8 10% 10 12% 21 26% 16 20% 22 27% 82 100% 
The distribution by size varies significantly according to the industrial sectors 
concemed. As can be seen in Table 8, while most SMEs established in the scientific, 
measuring and optical equipment had up to 100 employees, the majority of those 
corresponding to the chemical industry had over 300 employees. The intermediate size 
category (that is, that between 101-300 employees) appear as particularly important for 
the metal products branch as well as for SMEs established in the non-electrical 
machinery industry, the larger group in the sample. 
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Table 8 
Sample SMEs classifled by size and industry 
(Number of SMEs, in percentages) 
Nr. of employees 
Absolute 
Industries 5-100 101-300 301-500 Total figures 
Chemicals and allied products 26% 21% 53% 100% 19 
Metal products 9% 64% 27% 100% 11 
Machlnery, except electrical 22% 49% 29% 100% 41 
Electric & electronic equipment 41% 18% 41% 100% 17 
Scientific, measuring and 
optical equipment 56% 33% 11% 100% 9 
Transportation equipment 33% 33% 33% 100% 6 
Other manufacturing * 33% 33% 33% 100% 3 
Total 32% 36% 33% 100% 106 
Absolute figures 30 40 36 
* Note: Includes textiles, paper, and ceramics. 
Finns that belong to non electrical machinery, the chemical industry, and the 
electric and electronic equipment sector, are specialized firms in tenns of product lines 
and highly focused on specific markets. As a matter of fact 39% of sample SMEs 
manufacture one product line and 63% are dedicated to one market, almost always 
represented by another industry. Only about 10% of the SMEs are significantly 
diversified, in the sense that they deal with products of different industries. The sectors 
with a larger share of diversified firms are electrical-electronic, scientific and precision 
instruments, and chemical products. Finns in the transport equipment industry are the 
least diversified in tenns of product lines. Chemicals and electrical firms are th.ose that 
exploit more markets (See Table 9)1• 
1For a list of main product lines of sample SMEs see the Annex. 
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Table 9 
Product and market diversification, by industries 
(Number of SMEs, in percentages) 
Nr. of product lines 
Absolute 
Nr. of markets 
Absolute 
Industries 1 >1 Diff.tech. Total figures 1 >1 Total figures 
Chenùcals and allied products 33% 67% 100% 18 44% 56% 100% 18 
Metal products 36% 55% 9% 100% 11 90% 10% 100% 10 
Machinery, except electrical 42% 47% 11% 100% 38 65% 35% 100% 37 
Electric/Electronic equipment 31% 56% 13% 100% 16 63% 37% 100% 16 
Scientific, measuring and 
optical equipment 33% 44% 22% 100% 9 67% 33% 100% 6 
Transportation equipment 67% 33% 100% 6 50% 50% 100% 6 
Other manufacturing* 100% 100% 1 100% 100% 2 
Total 38% 53% 9% 100% 99 63% 37% 100% 95 
Abs. fig. 38 52 9 60 35 
*Note: Includes textiles, paper, and ceramics. 
2. Relative position and market structure 
To establish the relative position of sample S:MEs and the structure of the 
industries in which they operate, two basic sources of information were used. First, this 
exercise was based on the data from a U.S. survey carried out in 1982 by the Bureau 
of The Census which presents information on concentration ratios for that country at the 
firm level (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982). Although too aggregated (industries are 
defined at 4 digits), this information is useful for exploring the different general 
conditions of the various industrial structures in which S:MEs operate2• Secondly, the 
firm-level information collected in the interviews about the actual market structures in 
which the S:MEs were operating in their respective home countries was examined. 
2Given the difficulties of obtaining the same information for the 7 countries of origin, only 
U.S. data was used as a proxy for the whole population. The uti.lization of this source for 
interpreti.ng the situation of industries of other countries is acceptable, since as a whole the levels 
of concentration of the different industries of developed countries are roughly similar (Schepherd 
1985). 
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a) Levels of industrial concentration and the position occupied by SMEs according 
to the U .S. indus trial structure. 
In the first place, and for the industries in which ail the sample SMEs where 
established (that is, including SMEs of ail the seven countries of origin), an effort was 
made to examine the structure they present in the U.S., the country with the largest 
industrial sector. The purpose of this exercise was to shed light on the degree of 
concentration of each market and the place occupied by SMEs in them. 
In the referred U .S. survey, the data presented corresponds to the percentage of 
sales in each industry accounted for by groups of firms ordered from the largest to the 
smallest. More precisely, the information corresponds to the share in total sales of each 
industry controlled by the 4 largest firms, the 8 largest, the 20 largest, the 50 largest, 
and the rest of firms established in it. For each of those :five groupings the sales average 
was calculated. Only those strata in which annual sales of ail firms included were below 
u$s 1 OO million were considered as part of the SME category (for more details see the 
Appendix to this Chapter). 
For the 44 industries where the sample firms operate, Table 10 provides some 
indicators of their respective market structure in the U.S. An important feature of many 
of these markets is that they show remarkable concentration indexes. As a matter of 
fact, according to the classification used in the table it is evident that in the U .S., the 
32.5% of the markets where sample SMEs operate is highly concentrated; other 32.5% 
has a moderate concentration level and only the remaining 35% has low concentration 
levels. Not surprisingly, moderate or low concentration levels frequently coïncide with 
the existence of many companies in the same market (with only one exception in this 
latter group3), and in 70% of the cases, high concentration ratios account for markets 
3Plastic materials and synthetic resins (SIC 2821). 
27 
where less than 300 finns operate. Notwithstanding this fact, for a subset of industries 
(30% of all branches considered) high concentration indexes were found to coexist with 
a population of over 300 finns. 
Small and medium-sized firms account for at least 60% of the total sales in 
almost all the markets recording low concentration levels4• This empirical verification 
could be expected as long as they refer to industries in which productive processes, in 
general, are not based on the exploitation of economies of scale important enough to 
erect barriers to the entry of relative smaller size finns. In addition, and given the way 
the category of highly concentrated industries has been defined, it is not surprising to 
verify the existence of ten cases (over 13) in which the share in them of small and 
medium-sized firms was small (less than 30% of total sales). 
But in some cases, the existence of a direct inverse relationship between the 
concentration level and the relative share of small and medium-sized finns cannot be 
asserted. Taking into account the group of markets with a relatively high concentration 
ratio, that is to say where the 4 largest firms account for between 25% and 40%, or the 
8 largest between 40% and 70%,it can be observed that only in 3 branches (out of 13) 
the share of small and medium-sized firms is marginal; while in the majority of the 
remaining sectors those firms are able to place themselves in a leading position, 
- between the 4 largest - and hold a dominant share (namely they account for over 
60% of the total sales of the sector). 
4There are three exceptions pertaining to radio and television transmitting, signaling, and 
detection equipment and apparatus (SIC 3662), plastic materials, synthetic resins and 














































































































































The relative position of SMEs according to the U.S. industrial structure. 
% of sales accounted 
by largest finns 
4 8 20 50 
7 10 17 26 
9 15 27 44 
11 17 30 47 
9 15 27 43 
13 18 28 39 
10 15 24 36 
13 23 38 58 
17 26 44 69 
22 32 48 68 
15 23 38 57 
20 29 48 70 
21 33 50 70 
24 33 48 67 
24 36 54 74 
28 39 56 77 
27 34 47 63 
26 42 65 85 
31 44 63 82 
38 59 81 95 
39 61 94 100 
43 59 81 94 
22 32 46 63 
13 21 35 55 
31 37 47 57 
31 43 59 75 
29 40 59 77 
36 49 69 87 
47 63 83 98 
63 85 99 100 
22 35 57 73 
22 38 64 89 
19 30 51 77 
34 46 65 80 
26 42 69 90 
31 49 74 92 
61 69 77 84 
43 55 71 82 
42 52 69 81 
50 68 89 98 
45 57 72 84 
41 65 85 97 
58 71 88 97 
41 57 79 92 
52 70 84 94 
52 73 93 99 






Total sales Total 
value value 
low many finns very large 
low many finns large 
low many finns large 
low many finns large 
low many finns large 
low many finns large 
low many finns large 
low many finns medium 
low many finns medium 
low many finns medium 
low many finns medium 
low many finns medium 
low many finns medium 
low many finns medium 
moderate many finns medium 
moderate many finns medium 
moderate many finns medium 
moderate few finns 
moderate few finns 
moderate few finns 
high few finns 
low many finns 







moderate many finns very large 
moderate many finns large 
moderate many finns large 







low many finns very large 
low few finns very large 
low many finns large 
moderate many finns very large 
moderate many finns very large 
moderate few finns medium 
high many finns very large 
high many finns very large 
high many finns very large 
high few finns very large 
high many finns large 
high few finns large 
high few finns large 
high few finns large 
high few finns medium 




























































































Average SME's SME's share in 








































































































































Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986): 1982 Census of Manufactures, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, Table 5. 
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Note to Table 10 (column headings) 
1) Jndustry structure: 
i) Concentration levels: 
a) High: the 4 Jargest account for mon: than 40%, or the 8 largest for mon: than 70% of sales. 
b) Moderate: the 4 Jargest account for between 25% and 40%, or the 8 Jargest between 40% and 70% of sales. 
c) Low: the 4 Jargest account for less than 25%, or the 8 largest for less than 40% of sales. 
ü) Jndustry's population: 
a) Many firms: industries with mon: than 300 finns. 
b) Few firms: industries with up to 300 finns. 
ili) Total sales value (siz.e of industries). 
a) Very large: mon: than uSs 10 billion. 
b) Large: mon: than uSs 3 and up to 10 billion. 
c) Medimn: mon: than uSs l and up to 3 billion. 
d) Small: up to uSs 1 billion. 
2) SMEs sales value: siz.e of total sales by SMEs in respective industries. 
3) Upper limit SMEs cJass: Average sales of the sales category immediately above the SMEs cJass (no SME reaches such sales 
value). 
4) SMEs shan: in total sales: Shan: of each industry accumulated by categories of firms with annual average sales of less than u$s 
100 million: 
i) Dominant shan:: 60% 
ü) Important: between 30% and 60% 
ili) Marginal: less than 30% 
However, the most remarkable cases of relative share of small and medium-sized 
firms are those of the industries of porcelain electric supplies (SIC 3264) and 
earthenware bathroom accessories (SIC 3261) in which they occupy a place among the 
4 largest. Finally, let's point out the existence of the springs industry (SIC 3493) where 
only small and medium firms operate. 
Summing up, the analysis of these data shows that 65% of the industries where 
sample small and medium-sized firms operate have remarkable high concentration levels 
even having pursue the exercise using the data of the larger industrial economy and 
sticking to a four digit classification. As it has already been stressed, the interesting 
point is that the existence of small and medium-sized :firms in these situations does not 
always imply that the production is concentrated in the bands of a few big companies. 
On the contrary, even when faced with high concentration levels, situations were 
detected of industries where only small and medium-sized firms operate orthose in 
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which they are placed in leading positions in competition with big enterprises. On the 
other hand, the fact that some companies of smaller absolute size occupy quite a 
remarkable share of the market suggests that they have the capacity to generate 
competitive advantages and to appropriate them to build barriers to the entry of 
competitors. 
b) Concentration and oligopoly: the view of sample SMEs. 
The information stemming from the interviews to sample SMEs con.firmed the 
impression derived using the referred U.S. survey about the significance these firms 
have in the industries where they are located. In particular, the replies of those 
interviewed resulted in two quite interesting features referred to the SMEs share in the 
respective domestic markets5• 
First, as regards their main product lines, 48% of the firms alleged to have a 
share higher than 40% of their respective domestic market, 26% considered they 
controlled between 20% and 40%, and only 26% alleged to hold a proportion lower 
than a fifth of the total market. Only to one sector (that of electric and electronic 
equipment) do belong most of the sample SMEs that state to hold less than 20% of the 
respective market. In ail the other cases, - except in chemicals and allied products and 
in metal products - more than half can assert they dominated over 40% of the market 
for its major product. That is, a very important proportion of SMEs hold oligopolistic 
positions in their markets, in the sense that unilateral decisions taken by them would in 
ail probability affect the conditions of operation of their competitors. In the second 
place, it should be stressed that over half of the firms that furnished information 
5It should be stated that only 66 of a1l the finns interviewed provided information about the 
share they occupied in their respective industries. 
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regarding the current conditions in their domestic market stated that they were 
confronting few competitors. Not surprisingly this judgement was advanced by 88% of 
the companies alleging to have oligopolistic positions (namely, to control over 40% of 
the market). 
In conclusion, far from operating in low concentrated markets characterized by 
the proliferation of firms, it seems that the sample SMEs have been able to conquer 
quite important positions in highly concentrated markets from a double point of view: 
they account for a quite remarkable share of total production and confront a reduced 
number of competitors. On the other hand, the market power of these companies is 
strengthened by the fact that frequently (63% of the cases, in their own evaluation), they 
operate in non concentrated markets on the demand side. 
3. Technological behavior 
The relation between the expenses incurred in R&D over total sales indicates 
- even though imperfectly (refer, for example, to Dossi and Momigliano 1983)-the 
"technological intensity" of firms. With that aim, Kelly (1977) estimated for the U.S. 
manufacturing industry the mean value of the referred ratio for each sector. The 
conclusion of this analysis was that on average, U.S. firms spent the equivalent of 
\ 
2.26% of sales in performing activities in connection with R&D. 
Placing the data of the industries of studied SMEs in comparison with Kelly's 
results it cornes out that nearly 74% of the cases were established in "non technology 
intensive" industrial sectors - namely, where in average, firms allotted to R&D less 
than 2,26% of their sales and only the remaining 26% belonged to "technology 
intensive" industries. Non-technology intensive industries highly represented in the 
sample are metalworking and industrial machinery, metal products and some chemicals. 
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On the other hand, among the industries considered technologically intensive it is 
possible to place those devoted to electronic equipment and components, scientific and 
precision instruments and a number of chemical specialties. 
Table 11 
R&D intensity of sample SMEs compared to sector mean, by industrial sectors. 
(Nurnber of SMEs, in percentages) 
R&D compared to sector mean 
Absolu te 
Industries Less 1-3 tirnes >3 tirnes Total figures 
Chemicals and allied products 20% 30% 50% 100% 10 
Metal products 33% 67% 100% 3 
Machinery, except electrical 19% 44% 38% 100% 16 
Electric/electronic equipment 56% 11% 33% 100% 9 
Scientific, measuring and 
optical equipment 50% 50% 100% 4 
Transportation equipment 50% 50% 100% 2 
Total 33% 34% 33% 100% 44 
Absolute figures 14 16 14 
For a group of 44 sample SMEs information on their own expenses on R&D was 
obtained: When placed in comparison with the data for the average firm in their same 
industry, it cornes out conclusively that the majority of stuclied SMEs surpassed their 
competitors at this respect. Albeit the limitations of such an exercise, the fact, as table 
11 shows, that 67% of those SMEs for which information could be gathered devoted 
at least one time more resources to R&D than their counterparts, suggests that these 




A High· Tech Export-Oriented Canadian SME 
This is a specialized telecommunications producer 
founded in the early eighties out of a foreign 
subsidiary purchased by its Canadian executives. lt is 
located in a Montreal suburb. Although it bas only 250 
employees, it is now the world largest supplier of 
point-to-point microwave digital radio systems. A 
public company, it bas grown at a very rapid pace. 
Producing in batches for an expected demand, exports 
account for more than 80% of the company's sales. 
The company bought its very basic technology 
from the mother foreign company and, through intense 
research and development (16% of sales go to R&D) 
it came to the forefront of this specialized technology. 
B. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
1. Export performance 
lts product gives radio service to remote and 
scarcely populated areas, connecting the isolated users 
with the conventional telephone network. This 
technology bas proved useful in many developing 
countries; in three of them Company XX bas signed 
technology agreements with local finns in order to 
produce some of its equipment. 
Niosi, J., 
CEDREI-IDRC, Vol.I, 1990. 
For sample SMEs exports constitute a large share of their overall sales. As a 
matter of fact, 52% of the companies for which data could be gathered, export more 
that 50% of their total production while only 10% export less than 10%6• As Table 12 
shows, firms in the machinery and electric/electronic equipment industries appear as 
those with a higher export propensity. 
What is interesting is that the openness towards foreign markets is independent 
of the size of the firms and of the relative position achieved by them in their respective 
domestic markets. Most firms with less than 1 OO employees, as well as those with over 
300, export more than half of their production. Equally devoted to foreign markets are 
6Data are available on exports to sales ratio for 62 sample SMEs. 
34 
nearly 60% of the intermediate size companies. Also, the majority of those SMEs 
maintaining dominant positions (that is accounting for more than 40% of the sales of 
the industry in their country of origin) as well as those with a relatively smaller share 
(less than 20% of the respective domestic market), export more than half of their 
production. On the other hand, and not surprisingly, the proportion of export-intensive 
SMEs is higher among the most R&D intensive7 ones than among the rest8• 
Table 12 
Export propensity by industries 
(Nr. of SMEs, in percentages) 
Exports/sales ratio 
Abs. 
Industries <10% 10-25% 25-50% >=50% Total fig. 
Chemicals and allied products 50% 50% 100% 12 
Metal products 38% 38% 25% 100% 8 
Machinery, except electrical 13% 4% 17% 65% 100% 23 
Electric/electronic equipment 11% 11% 78% 100% 9 
Scientific, measuring and 
optical equipment 40% 40% 20% 100% 5 
Transportation equipment 50% 25% 25% 100% 4 
Other manufacturing * 100% 100% 
Total 10% 22% 16% 52% 100% 62 
Absolute figures 6 14 10 32 
* Note: tJùs sector includes textiles, paper, and ceramics. 
Regarding the destination of exports, a third direct them exclusively to developed 
countries; 46% sell their products both in developing and developed countries and only 
21 % export part of their production exclusively to developing countries. It is appropriate 
to refer in this regard that those firms exporting mainly to other industrialized countries 
were found to spend a relatively larger amount in R&D efforts. 
7 As regards the relationship between compennveness in the international market and 
innovative activity refer to, for example, Dossi, Pavitt, Soete (1990). 
8 According to data obtained for 52 finns, 85% of those alloting the equivalent of more than 
5% of their sales to R&D export more than half of their production. 
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2. Overseas production operations 
Sample SMEs were asked about their overall experience in international 
production ventures at the time of their participation in the case study which was single 
out in the current research, as well as at the moment they were interviewed 
The first important finding was that for 65% of sample SMEs, the studied 
venture was their first international production involvement. Furthermore, of those that 
had gained a previous experience, 58% had operated abroad only in developing 
countries. In other words, and rather striking at the light of the received literature, the 
majority of studied SMEs took their first steps in relation with the overseas transfer of 
productive resources in environments which were quite different from the ones they 
happened to be most familiar with. 
In order to deepen the understanding of the main factors which were behind 
SMEs international participation, firms were asked to indicate the one considered the 
most significant with respect to the case study singled out in this inquiry. The results 
are presented in table 13. As it can be observed, a first meaningful distinction has to 
do with the fact that for half of the sample SMEs the main determinant was the 
existence of an outside proposa! - that is to say, an invitation by an established firm 
(or occasionally an individual) in a given developing country, - while for the other 
half the decision to move abroad stemmed from the supplier itself. In these cases the 
recipient country's growth perspective were given particular importance in all countries 
with the exception of Argentina. This finding is not surprising given the distinctive 
weak economic performance of this country during the last two decades, in comparison 
with the much more dynamic situation of the other five economies. Import barriers 
played an important role in ventures in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico and 
India, while the use of the recipient country as an export platform was put forward as 
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an argument in a few cases in Singapore and Mexico. Finally, govemment incentives 
were quoted as the key motivation only in two cases9• 
Table 13 
Factors leading to foreign production ventures. 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Main factors Argentina Brazil India Korea Mexico Singapore Total Abs.fig. 
Outside proposais 95% 33% 59% 56% 24% 13% 49% 52 
Other referred factors 
Growth prospects 5% 28% 22% 22% 41% 53% 27% 29 
Import restrictions 28% 15% 18% 11% 12 
Re-exporting 4% 12% 20% 6% 6 
Govemment inducements 11% 13% 3% 3 
Nationals of same origin 6% 1% 1 
Other 6% 11% 6% 3% 3 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 106 
Abs. fig. 20 18 27 9 17 15 
The above referred distinction between SMEs that were led to operate abroad 
through the role exercised at this respect by firms in recipient countries and 
"autonomous" SMEs emerges as very significant and is one of the most useful 
analytical approaches put forward in this report. In fact, and contrary to the standard 
theory of international production, SMEs' foreign involvement cannot be explained only 
on the assumption that these :firms have an a priori strategy as to their expansion to 
overseas markets. Furthermore, and as it will be shown in the following Chapter, a large 
number of them appear to have participated in such ventures - at least in their first 
involvements - mainly as an opportunity to derive additional income of the licensing 
of technical resources. 
9It is interesting to notice that the presence in the recipient country of nationals -individuals 
or firms- of the same origin was mentioned as the key motivation by some German SMEs with 
operations in Latin America. The presence of enterprises of the same nationality was also 
detected as second or complementary motivation in three other cases. 
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This last situation is associated usually with SMEs that have a large export 
experience and that are not attracted by the perspective of producing their goods in 
foreign unknown locations. An illustration of this pattern has been depicted very clearly 
by Falzoni and Viesti (se upper part of Box B). Italian SMEs appear to get involved in 
projects overseas on a one-by-one approach, according to which production ventures 
abroad are not strongly interlinked among them and with the parent firm. More so, for 
some of these firms, their international projection is clearly a "second best" option in 
relation to which they prefer to maintain a relatively low commitment. 
The findings of this research demonstrate also that for another group of SMEs 
their foreign operations constitute part of their growth strategy aimed at implementing 
a global network (see an illustration in the lower part of Box B). Typically this occurs 
among firms with a large proportion of sales devoted to R&D efforts and that have 
opted for deepening their specialization. Rather at odds with the standard theory, these 
firms are not necessarily those with a relatively larger size. In fact, the evidence from 
the study has shown that in various cases of very small undertakings, the decision to 
move overseas has been taken very early in their growth path as a way of maintaining 
their competitive edge in a very specific product line. 
It is also interesting to refer that around 72% of SMEs declared that they had not 
explored alternative locations before transferring the know hows to the six selected 
developing countries. This answer was strongly determined by the business experience 
of SMEs in overseas markets. Those SMEs that had exported to the developing country 
to which a technology transfer operation was carried out afterwards, usually declared 
that they had not studied alternative locations. Those that had not exported to those 
markets did consider other alternatives. 
On the other hand, those SMEs which aimed at opening a production facility 
abroad which would play a role in their strategic planning, did engage in a selection 
38 
process. This was typically the case for those investments carried out in Singapore. Not 
surprisingly, given the relatively large proportion of Japanese SMEs with operations in 
the former, these suppliers were among those which analyzed more frequently other 
locations. In contrast, most Italian SMEs declared they have not examined other 
alternative recipient countries, since their main interest was to perform a specific deal 
to respond to a demand from a host country firm. 
It is appropriate in this context to point out to what extent sample SMEs did 
engage in the carrying out of market feasibility studies before they decided to transfer 
resources to developing countries. As a whole 67% declared that they had conducted 
those efforts. Not surprisingly, this outcome was particularly frequent when the SME 
established an equity controlled venture (80% of the cases) than when it participated as 
a licensor (56%). It should be underlined also, that the propensity to undertake those 
studies was higher in those SMEs run by professional managers and with higher R&D 
coefficients. In contrast, the majority of those SMEs that responded to outside proposals 
did not perform those analysis. These firms rested on their recipient counterparts to 
provide them with the relevant information to reduce the risks associated with the 
project. 
Another related issue has to do with the efforts undergone by SMEs to search 
for alternative partners or licensees. The survey results indicate that most of the cases 
(70%) in which a local firm ended participating in the venture, SMEs did not look for 
alternative firms. These results are explained by the fact that some SMEs had already 
previous links with a given developing country firm. In addition, the fact that a given 
firm from a host country decided to take the initiative to approach the SME was usually 
a determinant factor as to the future of the relationship between them. 
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Box B 
The Multi-Domestic International Strategy 
In all cases, ltalian SMEs have a multi-domestic 
international strategy instead of a global one. That is, 
they face each foreign market in a singular way, 
without any particular relationship with their behavior 
and operations in other markets. Ail foreign operations 
are in connection with the home country alone; their 
development and success have little if no relationship 
with that of other activities abroad. 
This is clearly interlinked with the foreign market 
orientation of the deals: the foreign production should 
be ail addressed to the local market. No flow of 
components, parts, semifinished products going from 
any foreign location to others or to the parent 
company. This reduces the need for a closer control 
both on the quality and on the amount of the foreign 
location production, with possibly no conflict of 
interest among different foreign ventures if they 
effectively work for their own local or neighboring 
markets. 
Falzoni, A. and Viesti G., 
CEDREI-IDRC, Vol.I, 1990. 
The Global Network International Strategy 
While large finns clearly learn and benefit from 
their subsidiaries abroad, we found some evidence that 
small firms might have some advantages in this area. 
They seem to be able to exploit their global networks 
effectively, partly because they Jack an extensive 
bureaucracy that might lengthen their communication 
and response times. 
The processing of one of Firm XX orders is 
a case in point. The company's sales representative in 
France received an order from a local customer and 
relayed it immediately to the manufacturing subsidiary 
in the U.K. The latter lacked the capability to make 
the parts, but accepted the order anyway, well aware 
that the necessary capability existed elsewhere in the 
organization. 
C. SYNTHESIS 
Details of the customer's needs were then 
transmitted by facsimile to the company's design 
department in the U.S. Using computer-aided design 
methods, the U.S. lab prepared production 
specifications that were transmitted by phone to the 
company's manufacturing plant in El Paso, Texas. 
This plant then coordinated with its "twin" unit in 
Juarez, Mexico to manufacture the parts. From Juarez 
the fmished parts where shipped to El Paso, and from 
there to the French customer's client in Venezuela. 
The whole process, from initial order to delivery took 
only 11 days ! 
Kolnl, T., 
CEDREI-IDRC, Vol.I, 1990. 
Sample firms are a special type of S1'1Es, since far from operating in markets 
with low levels of concentration they have been capable of conquering quite important 
positions in very concentrated markets. The fact that, in spite of their smaller absolute 
size, these firms maintain leading positions has much to do with the technological 
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strategy adopted by them, and particularly with the relatively high proportion of their 
sales income devoted to research and development. 
Most sample firms have a quite high propensity to export. Their respective 
competitive strategies seem to be structured around the possibility of selling their 
production in foreign markets, mainly to developed countries. Since they are technology 
intensive companies, a major part of their technological activity has been conceived 
bearing in mind the objective of increasing their foreign trade competitiveness. 
For most sample SMEs their foreign project in a developing country was their 
first international production experience. In half the cases studied, they were "pulled" 
by an outside proposa! put to them by a host country firm. The other half was inclined 
to operate abroad by a combination of interna! features - such as a high R&D 
commitment, - which led them to expand their sales income internationally, and their 
willingness to benefit from certain attractive features of a given foreign location. 
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATES OF SMEs' SALES IN EACH INDUSTRY 
As referred in the text, the U.S. survey classifies the data in percentages of sales 
of each industry accounted for by S cumulative groups that include the share accounted 
for firms ordered from the largest to the smallest. That is, the first 4, the first 8, the first 
20, the first SO, and the whole industry. This classification has been designed to show 
the relative importance of the largest firms. Therefore the significance of the smaller 
firms in each industry had to be estimated. This task was carried out by: 
1) Decomposing the cumulative groups in non-cumulative groups (i.e. make a 
partition in the whole population of firms in each industry) formed by firms 
grouped according to their positions in total sales: 
Original Cumulative Grouping 
Cl: 4 largest firms 
C2: 8 largest firms 
C3: 20 largest firms 
C4: SO largest firms 
CS: The whole industry 
Non-Cumulative Grouping 
G 1: 4 largest firms 
G2: 4 followers 
G3: 12 followers 
G4: 30 followers 
GS: Tail of the distribution (the whole industry less the SO largest) 
Where ... 
Cl= Gl 
C2 = Gl + G2 
C3 = Gl + G2 + G3 
C4 = Gl + G2 + G3 + G4 
CS= Gl + G2 + G3 + G4 + GS 
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2) Calculating the Share in Total Sales of each Non-Cumulative Group, by 
subtracting the percentages of the Cumulative Groups: 
Where: 
gl = c 1 
gz=C2-C1 
g3 = c 3 - c 2 
&=C4-C3 
g5 = 100% - c 4 
c1 = Share in Total Sales of Cumulative Group 1 (Census Data) 
g1 = Share in Total Sales of Non-Cumulative Group 1 (Calculated) 
Etc ... 
3) Calculating the Total Sales of each Non-Cumulative Group: 
Where 
S1 = g i • S 
S2=g2.S 
S3 = g 3. S 
S4 = g 4. S 
Ss = g s. S 
S =Total Sales Value of the Industry (Census Data) 
S1 =Sales Value of Non-Cumulative Group 1 (Calculated) 
S2 =Sales Value of Non-Cumulative Group 2 (Calculated) 
Etc ... 
4) Calculating the Average Finn Sales Value of each 
Non-Cumulative Group: 
a1 = S i/4 
~ ~ s z/4 
a3 = S J12 
a4 =SJ30 
as= s sfN-so 
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Where: a1 =Average Finn Sales Value of Gl 
3z =Average Finn Sales Value of G2 
a3 =Average Finn Sales Value of G3 
Etc ... 
N = Total Number of Finns in the lndustry 
N-50= Number of Finns in G5 (Tail of the distribution) 
The average sales of a group doesn't guarantee that ail the finns within such 
group have sales below a given amount. But ail the firms in the group have sales below 
the average of the group immediately above. The groups where ail the firms have sales 
below a certain amount are those whose group immediately above have an Average 
Finn Sales Value lower or equal to that amount. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
"class of SMEs" in each industry is composed by all the groups in which ail the firms 
sell for less than u$s 1 OO million, i.e. by the groups whereby the Average Finn Sales 
Value of the group immediately above is less than u$s 100 million. 
Establishment Basis of Reporting and Size of Finns 
The concentration ratios have been prepared from establishment reports. Under 
the establishment system, the shipments of a given company are distributed among ail 
of the industries in which it has establishments. In our estimate of SMEs' sales in each 
industry, only the manufacturing establishments within that industry are tak:en into 
account in determining the size of finns. Consequently, the presence of SMEs in a 
given industry may be overestimated due to the presence of small manufacturing 
establishments belonging to big firms from outside the industry. 
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CHAPTER III 
FORMS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1. Hvoothesis from the literature 
CEDREI' s previous research (White and Campos 1986) reviewed a number of 
other studies that have found a significant relationship between the size of firms 
investing. abroad, and their preferences towards equity control forms. The overall 
impression was that smaller firms tend to hold lower equity participation in affiliates 
in other countries (Stopford and Wells 1972, Tomlinson 1970, Ozawa 1985). The 
CEDREI and other studies also found that the environment "typical" of developing 
countries has a strong influence on the ownership strategies of smaller firms in 
particular. An exploration of the U.S. 1977 Census on direct investments abroad 
showed that, while the preferences of small and large firms did not differ with regard 
to investments in developed countries, they tended to vary with regard to locations in 
developing countries: smaller parents were more likely to adopt minority owned joint 
ventures than larger ones. These results were confirmed by Kohn using data from the 
1982 Census (Kohn 1988). Ozawa found the same differential attitude among smaller 
Japanese foreign investors (Ozawa 1985). 
The explanation about the differential impact of the developing countries' 
environment on the ownership strategies of SMEs is related to a couple of main and not 
always coïncident factors. First, it is argued that many developing countries tend to 
restrict the level of ownership of foreign investors, and that such restrictions are less 
"removable" or negotiable for smaller investors which have less to offer in exchange, 
and less strength and time to bargain. Secondly, smaller firms, more dependent on 
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individual and family decisions, are more sensitive to the "distance" factor, either 
physical or cultural. The same reasons that may explain the higher concentration of 
overseas investments by SMEs in nearby countries may also explain their tendency to 
look for risk-minimizing modes, or mechanisms facilitating a lower exposure in 
unfamiliar locations such as those of many developing countries. 
Y et in spite of their higher likeliness to adopt non-equity controlled forms, SMEs 
can still choose among licensing (or other arms-length forms of technology transfer) and 
minority joint ventures. Not enough evidence and theory is available with regard to this 
issue. The cost related and strategic considerations that explain their relative propensity 
to forego 100% ownership and to adopt minority joint ventures seem to be applicable 
t 
to the case of technology agreements. Telesio found that firms with little experience in 
manufacturing abroad will generally value the production capabilities of local companies 
and thus will be more likely to license (Telesio 1984). Stobaugh observed in the 
petrochemical industry that when many firms own similar technology, the use of both 
licensees and joint ventures is more frequent (Stobaugh 1984). 
Y et the use of technology agreements such as licensing depends on the type of 
technology transferred. In principle, such knowledge should be clearly identifiable and 
protected by exclusive and transferable rights. A survey of Japan's SMEs (Tokyo 
Chamber of Commerce, cited in Ozawa 1985) revealed a much higher utilization of 
equity rather than contractual forms for the transfer of technology, particularly to 
developing countries. Ozawa explained this pattern arguing that Japan's SMEs have 
comparative advantages in transferring human-centered (human-labor and organization 
embodied) technology, and standardized knowledge for which technology agreements 
are less justified, and that equity involvement facilitates "synergistic interactions" 
between SMEs and local companies. 
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Other authors have also argued that licensing presents policing and transaction 
costs which tend to be expensive (Contractor 1981); that unfamiliar partners (a typical 
situation of smaller firms and their foreign counterparts) would not easily become 
mutually reliable through mere contractual agreements, that is, without a doser 
involvement (Williamson 1975); that smaller firms lack experience in the formalization 
of knowledge through manuals and specifications, etc. (Wells 1983). 
On the other band, transactions of SMEs frequently involve single or "one shot" 
transfers of technology. Two different attitudes may follow from this circumstance, 
depending on the relative importance of the transfer for the suppliers and/or the 
recipients. The transaction might involve a "mainstream" knowledge of the SME and/or 
a high expected value of the revenues from its exploitation. A small, non diversified 
company may depend significantly from its only transfer abroad, and thus be willing 
to carry it out on an intra-firm basis. Or the transaction may involve a relatively low, 
short-term commitment on the part of a small company which is not willing, nor 
prepared, to develop a long-term relationship with the recipient party, in which case it 
is less likely to require an equity-based involvement. Many SMEs that receive 
unexpected demands from unknown firms in distant countries, or whose strategy of 
exploitation of such markets is based on exports which are suddenly challenged by 
import barriers, may be likely users of arms-length technology agreements. 
2. Organizational mode and SMEs' basic features 
The first important finding from the survey has to do with the variations. of the 
organizational forms according to the size of the studied firms. As Table 14 indicates, 
the strong preference of SMEs for non-equity controlled firms is confirmed but, as 
interesting is the fact that a significant change in pattern can be identified for those 
firms of more than 300 employees. This result suggests that within those firms defined 
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as SMEs different capabilities exist and as a result different strategies as to preferred 
organizational forms can be detected. 
Table 14 
Forms of involvement by size of SMEs and previous international experience 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Minority 
joint Equity Absolu te 
Contract ventures control Total figures 
Si:ze of SMEs 
(Nr. of employees) 
Less than 1 OO 72% 19% 9% 100% 32 
From 1 OO to 300 66% 23% 11% 100% 44 
More than 300 37% 18% 45% 100% 38 
Total 58% 20% 22% 100% 114 
Absolute figures 66 23 25 
Number of previous foreign 
production ventures 
None 66% 18% 16% 100% 44 
1-3 39% 26% 35% 100% 23 
More than 3 25% 0% 75% 100% 4 
Total 55% 20% 25% 100% 71 
Absolute figures 39 14 18 
The same can be said with respect to the previous international experience of 
SMEs. In fact, as Table 14 shows, those firms that had al least one previous foreign 
operation - be it an equity or non-equity venture - were those inclined to adopt 
equity rather than contractual forms. This result in part derives from the growing 
confidence that firms with previous experiences gain as to the best way of organizing 
the international transfer of resources. At the same time, as has been indicated, these 
results are also explained by the fact that for a group of sample suppliers the 
opportunity to participate in the project came as a proposai from a recipient firm already 
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operating in the host country. Very frequently, the type of organizational fonn preferred 
by these finns was a non-equity arrangement. 
This statement is supported from the evidence on the correlation between the 
origin of the initiative regarding the project and the outcome in tenns of organizational 
mode. Table 15 shows conclusively that when the initiative at that respect came from 
a host country finn, the most frequent result by far - 85% - was a licensing 
agreement. On the other hand, when the initiative was a responsibility of the SME a 
large share - 51 % - of the cases adopted equity controlled fonns. ln other words, and 
this is a point worth emphasizing, local initiativeness appear as a much stronger 




Forms of involvement and origin of initiative of the transfer 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Initiative 
Local SME 3rd party Mixed Total 
85% 16% 100% 100% 59% 
Minority joint ventures 12% 33% 0% 0% 20% 
Equity control 3% 51% 0% 0% 21% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 






The type of fonn has of course to do also with the characteristics of the recipient 
countries, and the motivations of the SME behind its participation in the venture. With 
respect to the first aspect, Table 16 shows very significant differences: while almost all 
cases in Argentina had to do with licensing agreements, the opposite occurred with 
those in Singapore. Brazilian and Mexican cases, on the other hand, included around 
a third of equity controlled ventures while no one of this type was identified in India 
and Korea ventures. 
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Such di:fferences reflect in part the mixed impact of two different factors: the 
size and growth of the recipient economy, which is supposed to influence positively the 
tendency to use intra-firm modes, and the existence or not of ownership or other 
restrictions on alternative channels or modes of technology transfer. The influence of 
the policy and legal factor is dramatized in the cases of India and Korea, on the one 
hand, and Singapore on the other. Policies and regulations in the former make virtually 
impossible or very difficult for foreign investors to hold majority control, while in the 
latter no such restrictions exist. In these cases, the legal factor seems to have much 
more impact than any economic consideration. On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico have had, during the period examined, relatively restrictive norms on both 
investments and technology imports. In Brazil, however, restrictions are stricter for the 
authorization of technology agreements than for foreign investments, while in Mexico, 
the "mexicanization" rule was liberalized only recently. The case of Argentina is an 
exception. The overwhelming weight of technology agreements undoubtedly expresses 
economic rather than legal factors, and particularly the lack of attractiveness of this 
country for risk investments in recent years. 
As could be predicted according to the received theory, those SMEs which were 
mainly attracted by the growth prospects of the recipient country, opted for equity 
control strategies rather than arms-length agreements (see lower part of Table 16). The 
same occurred with respect to SMEs whose affiliates were designed to serve as 
platforms for exporting to other countries. The need to assure a tight control of the 
production as well as marketing functions led firms to use that form. In contrast, firms 
reacting to import restrictions were less interested in majority ownerships, and most of 




Fonns of involvement, recipient countries,and motivations to choose tbem 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Minority 
joint Equity Absolute 
Con tract ventures control Total figures 
Recipient countries 
Argentina 95% 5% 0% 100% 20 
Brazil 39% 22% 39% 100% 18 
India 71% 29% 0% 100% 31 
Korea 83% 17% 0% 100% 12 
Mexico 35% 35% 29% 100% 17 
Singapore 13% 6% 81% 100% 16 
Total 58% 20% 22% 100% 114 
Absolute figures 66 23 25 
Factors 
Growth 14% 38% 48% 100% 29 
Protective measures 33% 42% 25% 100% 12 
Re-exporting 50% 0% 50% 100% 6 
Gov .inducement 67% 0% 33% 100% 3 
Outside proposai 87% 10% 4% 100% 52 
Nationals same origin 0% 100% 0% 100% 1 
Other 67% 0% 33% 100% 3 
Total 57% 21% 23% 100% 106 
Absolute figures 60 22 24 
An interesting pattern emerged from the distribution of the technology transfer 
operations over the period of about 2 decades in which the 114 cases were initiated. In 
effect, arms-length technology agreements tended to increase over the years, particularly 
after the 71-75 period, and wholly owned subsidiaries and majority owned joint ventures 
tended to decrease their share, particularly since the early eighties. This pattern seems 
to reflect the existence of various factors and forces. The decrease in the percentages 
of equity in the post seventies transactions might be explained in part by the lower 
attraction of three or four of the recipient countries for foreign investm.ents in general, 
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given the emergence of serious problems in their economies (particularly in Latin 
America). Yet after controlling for the recipient country factor, the same trend towards 
a larger use of non-equity forms, and technology agreements in particular, was noticed 
in Korea. Unfortunately the data at hand does not allow to verify if the current trend 
of liberalization of host country ownership regulations in countries such as lndia, Korea, 
Mexico and Argentina has influenced a new wave of SMEs with equity-controlled 
foreign participation. 
3. Modes preferred and implemented 
Sample SMEs were asked about their initial preferences with regard to forms of 
involvement, and their reasons thereof. They were also asked if they had to change their 
choices in the outcome, and why, in case they had. In 50% of the cases the SMEs had 
envisaged a technology agreement with a local enterprise; in 21 % they were willing to 
take a minority share in a joint venture; in 6% they wanted more than 50% ownership 
in a joint venture, and in 23% of the cases they preferred a wholly owned subsidiary. 
The main reasons to select technology agreements as an organizational form 
were costs, in terms of lack of sufficient resources needed or high risks perceived in the 
project (56% of the cases); better or faster access to the local market (16%); and legal 
requirements, or conditions established by the recipient party (16%). 
The exploration of possible firm-specific factors revealed that for smaller SMEs, 
corporate policy and "access" reasons were more important than for larger SMEs, which 
gave more importance to legal factors. This finding suggests that the former tended to 
view the technology agreements with more sympathy than the latter, which in the 
absence of legal restrictions probably would have preferred, or would have been 
prepared, to get more equity participation than what they were allowed to take. 
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The data also revealed that cost and risk considerations were relatively more 
important for the technology agreements of SMEs with lower levels of 
intemationalization and of R&D expenditures, as well as for those whose main 
motivations for the transfer of technology were outside proposais, govemment 
inducements or import protection measures to be circumvented. Cost reasons were 
concentrated on transfers to Latin America and Korea. Legal reasons and access to the 
market were much prevalent in SMEs with more international experience, higher R&D 
expenditures, and attracted by the size and growth of the host countries' markets. Le gal 
factors were concentrated in projects in India. 
The preference or acceptability of minority joint ventures was explained by the 
suppliers on the basis of the main following reasons: a) better access to the local market 
(40% of the operations); b) legal factors (33%); c) access to local financial resources 
(7% of the cases). It was evident that the contribution of the local partners and 
particularly their knowledge and connections in the recipient countries were a major 
reason for seeking or accepting minority shares. With regard to the legal reasons, they 
correspond to cases located in Brazil, lndia and Mexico, where govemment policies 
mandate or encourage such forms of foreign investment. Legal restrictions were also 
more significant for R&D intensive SMEs, and financial considerations for the smaller 
and less intemationalized suppliers. 
Subsidiaries and majority owned joint ventures were basically preferred for two 
basic, highly related factors. About half of the suppliers declared that such was the 
normal policy of the company. The other half recognized that the objective was to 
secure the control of the technology transfer. These cases were typical of more 




The advantages of non-equity fonns 
The empirical evidence of cases under study 
shows that the "non-equity fonns are the most frequent 
contractual solutions adopted by ltalian SMEs 
transferring technology to LDCs. 
Several factors may explain this behavior. On the 
side of the finn, non equity fonns shaiply reduce 
investment outlays and the rislcs involved; this holds 
particularly true as small finns are concerned, whose 
global amount of financial resources is quite limited. 
Moreover, in the case of several LDCs, the risks of 
direct investment increased during the '80s, due to the 
worsening of their financial and economic situation. 
Non-equity forms permit a more flexible strategy, 
reducing the global risks and enhancing the 
possibilities for the finn going international to 
withdraw from the deal. 
This behavior is also due to technology import 
policies of some countries (i.e. India and Korea) 
characterized by the careful management and control 
over the process of importing and assimilating 
technical knowledge via selective use of FDI and non-
equity forms complemented by the development of 
indigenous technological capabilities. 
For smaller firms the importance of cooperating 
with a local partner is very significant Both via joint 
equity ventures (as seen above SMEs show a larger 
proportion of joint ventures over their total foreign 
investment) or, more frequently, by non-equity 
agreements, smaller firms try to benefit from the skills 
and the knowledge of their partner. In a sense, there is 
always an exchange of "complementary assets": even 
when the deal involves a "pure" transfer of 
technology, some knowledge is acquired from the 
partner in exchange; when the deals are more 
articulated, this exchange is richer and more complex. 
Falzoni, A. and Viesti, G., 
CEDREI-IDRC, Vol.I, 1990. 
It is interesting to point out that SMEs in 90% of the cases declared to have 
celebrated the arrangements that they had originally envisaged. Table 17 indicates that 
those that looked for technology agreements, minority joint ventures or subsidiaries 
indicated that in most cases they obtained what they wanted. But, of course, this is an 
ex-post opinion, and taking into consideration that in most cases several years had 
elapsed since the project was initiated, should not be given to much weight. In any case 
it appears as if in only two ventures the initial choices for licensing agreements had to 
be changed for minority joint ventures - the local partner insisted on a greater 
involvement of the supplier - or a wholly owned subsidiary, because the negotiation 
with a potential licensee failed; a project for a minority joint venture ended up in a 
licensing agreement, and an initiative for setting up a subsidiary had to be implemented 
as a minority joint venture. In contrast, 3 of 4 projects of majority owned joint ventures 
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had to be changed; two of them for minority shares and the other one for a wholly 
owned subsidiary, because the potential local partner's proposai was considered 
unacceptable. 
Table 17 
Initial choice of form of involvement and fmal outcome 




Form adopted Con tract venture venture Subsidiary Total 
Contract 94% 7% 0% 0% 49% 
Minority joint venture 3% 93% 50% 6% 26% 
Majority joint venture 0% 0% 25% 0% 1% 
Subsidiary 3% 0% 25% 94% 24% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 







U.S. and U.K. firms were those most affected by the changes (29% and 22% of 
their projects respectively), and Korea was the recipient country where the initial plans 
had to be altered more frequently (27% of the cases). In more than half of the cases, 
local governments (those of lndia and Korea) were the specific factors for the change 
of forms. Negotiations with local recipients and other, usually unexpected reasons, 
motivated the remaining changes. 
A somewhat unexpected high share of the intra firm technology transfers took 
place by the establishment of new companies in the recipient countries. Only 10% of 
the cases were carried out through the purchase of shares of existing companies. This 
finding may seem surprising given the already discussed propensity of small firms to 
complement their relative scarce resources with those of ongoing local companies. Y et 
a high percentage of the "greenfield" investments made by the SMEs (43%) were 
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organized in association with local partners, and in most of these cases, the latter 
preserved the equity control of the joint ventures. 
All the wholly owned subsidiaries in the sample were established by the creation 
of a new company, except for one case, which resulted from a takeover of a local firm. 
The reasons for setting up wholly owned ventures have to do with some firm-specific 
advantages (size, international experience) and with a number of variable circumstances 
of each case, such as the origin of the initiative, the SME's motivations to undertake 
the project, or the lack of suitable local partners. The desire to secure control of the 
operation was the main reason reported by the suppliers. 
The few cases in which the entry method was the purchase of shares of an 
existing company or the participation in a capital increase represented, except for the 
case just mentioned, the association of SMEs in minority-owned joint ventures. Also 
with one exception, the purchase of shares was a behavior observed only in the case of 
German SMEs (75% of the investments of this origin entered in this way) and for 
projects in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Korea. Most of these SMEs had over 300 
employees and a high level of intemationalization, but significantly, they had no 
previous antecedents in the respective recipient countries. ln one case, the reason for 
this method of entry was that the recipient was a company of the same national origin. 
In conclusion, SMEs that choose to invest rather than license show a high 
propensity to undertake green:field operations (rather than joining or taking over ongoing 
ventures), with all the implications of this entry method in terms of organization of 
totally new operations; but in a significant proportion of these cases the ventures were 
organized. as joint ventures with already established companies. The tendency to 
undertake greenfield ventures appears associated to the sophistication of the technology 




As a whole studied SMEs participated in production ventures in developing 
countries through non equity forms much more frequently than has been portrayed by 
the literature in relation to large firms. Their lack of sufficient resources and of 
international experience explains this outcome. But it would be misleading to conclude 
that always those modes are preferred by these undertakings. In fact, the evidence from 
this study has demonstrated that the organizational mode adopted has much to with 
factors totally or partially out of control of SMEs. 
Specifically, the data gathered shows that the origin of the initiative regarding 
the venture heavily determined the organizational mode employed. When the project 
was put before the SME by the domestic firm established in a developing country that 
ended up as technology recipient, the result was, in most cases, a licensing agreement. 
A more balanced outcome occurred when the SME itself was the initiator of the project. 
In addition, the preference for equity forms increased the larger the international 
experience of SMEs, and the higher the sophistication of the products they 
manufactured. To a greater extent than large transnational corporations, SMEs appear 
to be more dependent of the institutional setting existent in developing countries as 
regards regulations on foreign direct investment or technology contracts. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS: CONTENTS AND CHANNELS 
This Chapter is devoted to a presentation of some of the most relevant issues that 
have to do with the actual transfer by SMEs of their skills to host countries and the role 
of recipient firms in this process. lt will first describe the four main channels used and 
indicate the more frequent type of firm in developing countries that received them. 
Afterwards, a discussion on specific aspects of the provision by SMEs of know hows 
through the most frequently used channels is put forward. 
1. Contents of the transferred technologies 
Product technology - namely, technical knowledge for the goods to be 
manufactured in accordance with given specifications - was exclusively negotiated in 
23% of the 114 technology transactions recorded by our research. Other one-third of 
technology deals involved both product and process technology, (manufacturing 
methods, organizational practices, quality control, etc.). Plant technology - which 
implied the knowledge and information required for the setting up of a manufacturing 
establishment -jointly with either product or process technology was at stake in only 
5% of the technology transfer cases. Finally, whole sets of know hows, that is 
containing product, process and plant technology were the subject matter in almost 
40% of the operations. 
As emerges from table 18, the content of the know-hows was transferred through 
the provision of technical assistance, blue-prints, critical parts or components, and 
special equipment. As it cornes out, both technical assistance and blue-prints were 
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included in almost all technology transactions. However, while exports of special 
equipment were mostly attached to the transfer of all-included packages, imports of 
parts were decreasingly distributed from amongst those cases for which more inclusive 
and complex packages to those for which only product technology was transferred. 
Table 18 
Know-how contents and means of tecbnology transfer 
Percentage of cases in each grouping using the 
Classification of cases 
respective technology transfer instrument 
by know-how content of Technical Cri tic al Special Nwnber 
the technology transfer assistance Blueprints parts equipment of cases 
Product 100% 100% 38% 8% 26 
Product & process 100% 97% 47% 21% 38 
Plant & product & process 100% 100% 50% 50% 6 
All-included packages 100% 95% 67% 69% 42 
Ali cases 100% 97% 53% 38% 112 
Absolute figures 112 109 59 42 
As it could be anticipated, the contents of the know hows transferred were 
strongly associated with the organizational form of the ventures. Those cases in which 
complete packages predominated were usually related with foreign equity controlled 
projects, while those in which only product or product and process know hows were 
provided, licensing agreements prevailed. 
The distribution by recipient countries reveals strong differences (see table 19). 
The transfer of all three know hows predominates in Singapore; in Argentina, Korea and 
Mexico the combined transmission of product and process know hows is more frequent; 
while in India almost 42% of the transactions involved product technology exclusively. 
These various patterns to a large extent seem to reflect the different modalities and 
criteria of intervention of the govemments of recipient countries in the technology 
transfer process. The open policy of Singapore with regard to the inflow of foreign 
investment and technology, for example, explains the more diversified nature of the 
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technology transfers to this country while the partial transfers to Korea seem to be 
associated to the existence of institutional restrictions and technology transfer controls. 
Y et the table shows that the relationship between those restrictions and the scope of the 
transfer is not very clear. Limited transfers were found in many cases of projects in 
countries whose policies would have in principle admitted a larger involvement of the 
suppliers. Even in the case of India, which has applied restrictive policies over the last 
two decades, a high share of cases involved the joint transfer of the three basic know 
hows, which suggests the existence of some flexibility either in government practices 
or in the SMEs' attitudes vis a vis the control of their technological advantages. 
Table 19 
Contents of know-bows of the tecbnology transfer by bost country 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Know-hows content 
Plant 
Product & product All-included Absolu te 
Product & process or process packages Total figures 
Argentina 25% 70% 5% 100% 20 
Brazil 28% 22% 6% 44% 100% 18 
India 42% 13% 6% 39% 100% 31 
Korea 25% 58% 8% 8% 100% 12 
Mexico 47% 47% 100% 17 
Singapore 6% 6% 88% 100% 16 
Total 23% 33% 5% 39% 100% 
Absolute figures 26 38 6 44 114 
2. Technology transfer through blue prints and technical assistance 
In what follows a detailed analysis of some of the issues related with the 
utilization by SMEs of the two most frequently used channels of technology transfer 
will be pursued. 
60 
a) Blue prints 
Industrial firms are obliged to maintain an accurate record of the specifications 
of the fabricated products as well as of the different phases and procedures followed to 
manufacture them. Usually this record is translated into blue prints and instructions that 
workers and technicians at the shop floor are supposed to follow as precisely as 
possible. But the extent in which ail relevant specifications are formalized in drawings 
and written instructions varies among firms. 
Two main factors are particularly relevant at this respect. The first one has to do, 
as Teece has indicated, with the age of the technology (Teece 1977). Relatively more 
stable know hows are more easily translated into written specifi.cations than those that 
are going through a continuous change. The second one, has to do with the firm's 
behavior at this respect. Sorne firms prefer to follow strictly detailed formalized 
instructions while others tend to rely more one the accumulated knowledge and 
experience of its workforce and technicians. As it will be taken up below, this last 
feature has also to do with the type of industry the firm is established in. 
There are a couple of strong reasons to suggest that the level of formalization 
of SMEs as a whole is, ceteris paribus, lower than the one of large firms. The first one 
is related to the fact that SMEs usually operate one manufacturing plant. As a result the 
elaboration of detailed instructions needed to ease communications among a complex 
network of production facilities as in the case of large firms, is not so demanding. 
Furthermore, the usually small number of operatives and technicians in the shop floor 
at SMEs, makes the exchange of tacit knowledge easier than in larger establishments. 
On the other hand, SMEs operate frequently in a series of industrial activities in 
which "custom-made" is the prevalent mode of production organization. The need to 
flexibly respond to their clients demands leads firms that operate under this mode to a 
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permanent adjustment of the specifications of the fabricated products which, in turn, not 
always are translated into written instructions. 
To analyze this topic in the present survey, recipient finns were asked to rate the 
quality of the blue prints delivered to them by the SMEs. More specifically, they were 
requested to indicate if they considered them understandable and clear enough to 
operate with them or if they needed the technical assistance of the supplier to this end. 
As a whole, 10% of the recipients indicated that blue prints were not sufficiently clear. 
But this proportion increased to 16% when only technical agreements were considered. 
b) Technical assistance 
Ail studied cases included the provision by the SME of technical assistance to 
the recipient finn. This is not surprising. It is well known, that only part of the 
knowledge and skills controlled by a finn are fonnalized in written instructions or 
incorporated in special tools and equipment. The rest is "embodied" in the finn's 
personnel. As a consequence, there is no way of really transferring production 
knowledge from one finn to another without the involvement of such people. 
Of course, the relevance of technical assistance may vary in different 
circumstances, and particularly according to the extent of the fonnalization efforts 
conducted by the finns. Sorne suppliers may develop a very precise method to 
"translate" product speci:fications as well as manufacturing instructions into written, 
codi:fied procedures, while others may base their daily operations in a larger extent on 
the experience accumulated by its technicians, as well as blue-collar workers, after years 
of perfonning similar tasks. 
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In the same vein, technologies which are in a "state of flux", are usually much 
less codified than those which are relatively more settled. The former happen to be 
much more difficult to transfer intemationally than those from which their basic 
"routines" and main features have not undergone major changes for some time . As 
Teece has put it, this is so because "engineering drawings are more likely to be 
finalized and the fundamentals of the technology stand a better chance of being more 
fully understood" (Teece 1977). 
Specifically in relation to the subject of study of this report, it is reasonable to 
suggest that SMEs would experience, in general, some constraints when it cornes to 
transfer technologies through technical assistance. In fact, while blue prints, in principle 
- if they can be supplied "from the shelf' - can be a low cost channel to transfer 
technical resources, the commitment of personnel to assist a firm in a foreign country 
may imply putting some "strain" to SMEs, by definition, limited technical human 
capabilities. It has to be underlined, that for an SME dispatching a small group of 
engineers or technicians entails - particularly if for a relatively long time - suffering 
a drain in its human resources which cannot be so easily handled as in the case of a 
large corporation. 
The data from the survey indicates that in 65% of the studied cases technicians 
from the SME were sent to the recipient firm. The extent of this performance varied 
mainly with the nature of the project and the degree of control of the SME over the 
host country firm. As table 20 shows, large differences emerged at this respect 
according to the type of know hows transferred by the SME. When a complete set of 
the latter were transmitted - that is, product, process as well as plant technologies -
the engagement of SME technicians in the foreign project was greater than when only 
product know hows were transferred. 
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This result derives, of course, in part, from the fact that it is relatively easier to 
transmit the relevant know hows without the direct participation in the recipient country 
of SMEs technicians, when they have to do with one specific variety and not with a 
wide spectrum of skills as is the case when complete manufacturing plants have to be 
established from scratch. But this is one side of the coin. The other important aspect 
- and this topic will be taken again below - is that in the studied cases when a 
complete set of know hows was transferred the usual situation was one in which no pre-
existent recipient firm performed the role of absorbing and assimilating those 
technologies. 
SMEs got involved in the transfer of their human resources to the recipient firm 
in a larger extent when they had an equity participation in the latter than when they 
only transmitted their skills through licensing agreements (see table 20). Again this in 
part has to do with the strong association already referred to between organizational 
modes and contents of the transferred technologies. But the greater involvement of 
SMEs technicians has also to do with the role assigned to the recipient firms by those 
undertakings. This can be illustrated regarding the export behavior of the former. In 
fact, in those cases in which recipient firms had a regular export program it was 
relatively more frequent the engagement of technical personnel from the SME in the 
host country than when the project was aimed at supplying the latter's domestic market. 
The more tighter control on manufacturing practices on the part of SMEs on those 
export oriented recipients explains this much greater involvement. 
It cornes as no surprise, given the already referred correlations between 
organizational modes and recipient countries, that the involvement of SMEs technicians 
varied significantly according to the host countries. As table 20 indicates, while over 
80% of the Mexican and Singaporean cases had received technical personnel from the 
SMEs, the corresponding figure was of only 30% in the case of Argentina and it was 
for India a few points below the average for the total sample. 
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Table 20 
Technicians sent from SME to local flJ'Dl by technological content, organizational form, 
export behavior of recipient, host country and previous R&D efforts to obtain the technology 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
T echnicians sent from 
SME to the Recipient Finn 
Absolute 
Yes No Total figures 
Technological content 
Product technology 44% 56% 100% 25 
Product & process tech. 55% 45% 100% 38 
Plant & product or process 75% 25% 100% 4 
Product, process & 
plant technologies 84% 16% 100% 44 
(N=lll) 
Organizational fonn 
Licensing agreement 53% 47% 100% 66 
Minority joint venture 80% 20% 100% 20 
Equity controlled venture 84% 16% 100% 25 
(N=lll) 
Export behavior of recipient 
No experts 58% 42% 100% 26 
Infrequent experts 65% 35% 100% 23 
Experts on a regular basis 77% 23% 100% 26 
(N=75) 
Host country 
Argentina 30% 70% 100% 20 
Brazil 71% 29% 100% 17 
India 60% 40% 100% 30 
Korea 73% 27% 100% 11 
Mexico 88% 12% 100% 17 
Singapore 81% 19% 100% 16 
(N=lll) 
The recipient tried to obtain 
the same technology by R&D efforts 
Yes 23% 77% 100% 13 
No 68% 32% 100% 40 
(N=53) 
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As anticipated, the existence of previous local technical capabilities on the part 
of the recipient firm has had a strong impact on the extent in which SMEs technicians 
travelled to the host country to deliver their skills. In fact, table 20 shows that great 
variations exist according to the degree in which at the recipient :firm efforts were 
conducted to develop the know hows that were finally imported from the SME. In other 
words, when the recipient firm had invested time and resources to try to solve some 
specific technical problems and/or corne out with a given product variety, they were in 
less need to receive technicians from the suppliers. They just went on for very detailed 
pieces of information and for that purpose a more efficient and cheaper procedure was 
to obtain the corresponding blue prints and send to the SME their own technical 
personnel. 
In fact, technical assistance was also provided to recipient' s personnel by SMEs 
in their home country plants. In 81 % of the studied cases personnel from the recipient 
travelled to receive technical instructions. As with the previous mode, the extent and 
significance of this procedure varied between :firms. Sorne cases included the stay of 
recipient firm' s personnel for up to two months while in others their permanence could 
be counted in days. At the same time, it was evident from the interviews that the 
organization and formalization of the transfer of skills varied according to the home 
country of the SME (see Box D). But as a whole, the impression conveyed from the 
sample cases was that the recipient technicians had to have a reasonable prior level of 
knowledge to profit from their stay at the SME headquarters. The "high mark" which, 
as it will be seen, usually SMEs gave to the role performed by recipient technicians 
tends to support this point. 
Of course the above statement applies in particular to those cases in which 
licensing agreements were celebrated. On the one hand because in them recipients had 
usually some basic technical capabilities to begin with. On the other, because these 
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firms were willing to pay limited amounts in terms of royalties and as a consequence 
SMEs were inclined to restrict the total amount of know hows supplied. 
BoxD 
Flow of Personnel Between Parent and Subsidiary: Japanese vs European Firms 
Ali Japanese finns sent local technicians to J apan 
for training. They do so not only to transfer technical 
skills but also to familiarize local technicians and 
engineers with the corporate culture of the parent 
company. They believe head office training will help 
local technicians and engineers to work better with the 
head office. 
Japanese SMEs also sent their engineers and 
technicians to their Singapore plants, in most cases for 
periods of up to three months. Compared to SMEs 
from other industrial countries, Japanese SMEs are 
more likely to encourage a two-way flow of persOIUlel 
between the head office and its subsidiaries, a practice 
that improves cooperation and understanding between 
the head office and the Singapore subsidiary. 
European finns, on the other hand, depend more 
on local on-the-job training, especially when 
introducing low-tech products. Two reasons explain 
the lower reliance on home country training among 
European firms. First, home country training ü it 
involves many persons is more costly for them than 
sending their technicians to Singapore. Second, 
European SMEs view home country training mainly in 
technical terms and do not see it as an important 
element in fostering company spirit and cooperation 
between themselves and their Singapore plant. 
P.E. Fong and A. Paloheimo, 
CEDREI-IDRC, Vol.Il. 1990. 
The Argentine experience is appropriate to mention at this point. In fact, 
practically ail cases celebrated by studied SMEs in Argentina were circumscribed to 
licensing agreements, themselves entered mainly in product and process know hows. 
The relatively low total income that SMEs could expect to receive from their transfer, 
led recipient firms to carry out by themselves the task of obtaining in situ (that is, in 
the home country) the relevant know hows. It was not rare that one or two technicians 
travelled to the SME headquarters to absorb and actualize the imported know hows. It 
is interesting to underline that in many of these cases the persona! relationship between 
entrepreneurs and technicians from both firms allowed the process to be carried out 
smoothly. It is probably reasonable to point that this type of exchanges heavily based 
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in "gentlemen agreements" are a feature of the technology transfer by SMEs which 
would be rarer to find when dealing with large transnational corporations. 
It is interesting to indicate that the judgement on the role played by local 
technicians was not severely biased by the source of the information. In fact, it would 
be natural to expect recipients highly grading their own staff' s role in the transfer 
process. A more neutral statement would be anticipated for the SMEs own judgement. 
As table 21 shows on the whole a similar pattern emerges. Furthermore, in ail those 
cases that were "matched" the opinions of suppliers and recipients were notably similar. 
Table 21 
Role of local technicians by source of information 
and organizational form or technology transfer 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Local technicians' role 
Very Fairly Not Absolute 
Source of information significant Significant significant significant Total figures 
Recipient 44% 39% 15% 2% 100% 41 
Supplier 59% 4% 33% 4% 100% 27 
Bo th 58% 24% 9% 9% 100% 33 
Total 52% 25% 18% 5% 100% 
Absolute figures 53 25 18 5 101 
The highly appreciated role of local technicians is explained essentially by the 
limited transfer capabilities of SMEs. In fact, it came out clearly from many interviews 
that the suppliers preferred as far as possible to use local-recipient firm's personnel that 
allocating their scarce technical resources directly to the transfer process. Of course, this 
outcome in part depended as it was seen, on the aims of the SME as to the overseas 
venture, but it also had to do with the objective restrictions of many of them to transfer 
technology to developing countries. 
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To deepen this issue, recipient finns were asked to evaluate the transfer capacity 
of the suppliers: 44% of those that responded, rate it as "good", while the rest divided 
by half their opinions in what they considered a "fair" or "poor" capacity. The 
interesting finding to refer here is that those judgements were found to be strongly 
correlated with what recipients thought was their technicians role in the transfer process 
(see Table 22). In other words, recipient finns without making an explicit linkage 
between both variables, view the latter' s role as a substitute of the SMEs limited 
transfer capability. 
Respondents from developing country finns made their assessment of SMEs' 
transfer capabilities according to their evaluation of the technology transfer experience 
they have gone through. In other words, their view of SMEs' referred capabilities was 
strongly determined by a single case, and this one, it could be argued may not be a 
good indicator of the suppliers potential to transfer know hows intemationally. 
In fact, SMEs may be not inclined to get deeply involved in a given venture in 
developing countries because of factors which have not to do with their transfer 
capabilities. In this regard, it should be taken into consideration that some SMEs 
considered the present and expected income from the venture as low in relation to the 
efforts that the transfer of know hows implied. In other words, they provided the 
recipient with a limited amount of technical resources because the costs of supplying 
more would clearly surpass those earnings. It cornes out as no surprise that in these 
cases recipients had to fi.11 the gap of the insufficient direct provision of know hows by 
the SME, with their own technical efforts. 
But it would be misleading to conclude that SMEs transfer capabilities have only 
to do with factors such as those referred. In fact, from the survey it came out that the 
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level of intemationalization of SMEs measured by a constructed index1 - which is a 
good proxy as to the extent of experience of these finns in transferring their know hows 
to foreign markets - was strongly related with the recipients judgement of SMEs' 
transfer capabilities. As Table 22 shows (unfortunately information is available only for 
cases for which questionnaires from both supplier and recipient were received), those 
capabilities were rated as "good" in 86% for those SMEs that had a higher degree of 
intemationalization while the corresponding figure for those with a low degree was 
39%. Furthermore, no highly intemationalized finn was graded with a "poor" transfer 
capability while this occurred with 33% of those with a low international experience. 
To end this section, it is appropriate to recall that technology transfer implies 
essentially the transmission of knowledge and skills from personnel working at the 
SMEs to technicians and personnel employed in recipient finns. In a way then, the 
significance of this process has much to do - and particularly so in social benefit 
terms - with the number of people involved and the extent in which the transmission 
of technology is made in a systematic or unsystematic manner. Few mechanisms can 
be considered more fruitful for developing countries than the one that implies training 
workers and technicians in new manufacturing skills and procedures. 
The results of this survey at first glance could lead erroneously to a not 
particularly stimulating conclusion. In fact, only in 14% of the cases recipient finns 
declared that a special training program was carried out. But as could have been 
expected, the propensi ty to undergo training programs was strongl y related to the 
contents of the know hows transferred as well as to the existence or not of a recipient 
1 The index was constructed in a way that gave licensing agreements celebrated worldwide 
by SMEs 1 point while equity-based ventures were given 2 points. "Low" involvement means 
a firm having a score of 4 points or less, "medium" from 5 to 8 points, and "high" from 9 points 
onwards (i.e. a "high" degree may result from an SME having 9 technology agreements, or 4 
direct investments and 1 agreement). 
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finn capable of absorbing the imported technologies. When this factors are taken into 
consideration the picture changes significantly. 
Table 22 
Local recipients, evaluation on the transferring capabilities of the foreign technology supplier 
by role of the local technicians, recipient's previous experiences acquiring foreign technology, 
and level of intemationalization of the supplier 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Evaluation 
Absolute 
Good Fair Po or Total figures 
Role of the local technicians 
Very significant 24% 38% 38% 100% 29 
Significant 56% 19% 25% 100% 16 
Fairly significant 63% 25% 13% 100% 8 
Not significant 100% 100% 4 
Total 44% 28% 28% 100% 
Absolute figures 25 16 16 57 
Previous experiences acquiring 
foreign technology 
None 33% 44% 22% 100% 18 
License agreements 33% 8% 58% 100% 12 
Joint ventures 17% 67% 17% 100% 6 
Both 50% 50% 100% 2 
Total 32% 34% 34% 100% 
Absolute figures 12 13 13 38 
Levelofinternationalization 
Low 39% 28% 33% 100% 18 
Medium 75% 13% 13% 100% 8 
High 86% 14% 100% 7 
Total 58% 21% 21% 100% 
Absolute figures 19 7 7 33 
Table 23 illustrates this point. As can be observed, in 43% of those cases in 
which the SME had an equity control over the recipient a training program had been 
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implemented. This figure is a more proper one to take under consideration, since it 
relates with a sub-set of cases for which workers and technicians training often 
constitutes a prerequisite to allow the project to take off. 
Table 23 
lmplementation of a training program by ownership pattern 
of technology transactions 
(Nr. of cases, in percentages) 
Ownership pattern of Training program Absolute 
technology transactions Yes No Total figures 
Licensing agreements 12% 88% 100% 66 
Minority shareholding by SME 32% 68% 100% 22 
Equity controlled by SME 43% 57% 100% 23 
Total 23% 77% 100% 
Absolute figures 15 86 111 
The important point to underline here is that the data does not support the 
hypothesis according to which SMEs could be looked upon as necessarily weaker agents 
at the time of transferring capabilities through training. In fact, taking into consideration 
the essential limited resources of these firms it could have been thought that they would 
not be usually in a condition of carrying out systematic efforts to train personnel of 
recipient firms. Furthermore, given the large supply of labor in developing countries, 
it could have been anticipated that SMEs (as well as recipient independent firms) would 
have had no (or very limited) inducements to carry out this investment in human 
resources, with the additional risk of the trained workers moving to other firms. 
Although certainly a particular case, it is interesting to pin point that for Japanese SMEs 
that transfer skills intemationally the training of host country personnel is probably one 
of their most salient features. Ozawa, who has worked extensively on this topic, 
presents his findings in a very clear-cut way (see Box E). 
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Box E 
Japanese SMEs: transfer through training 
What the developing host countries receive from 
Japan's small multinationals, then, are mostly basic 
shop-floor production technologies (assembly, 
fabrication, and processing skills that can be 
transferred to local employees through training). 
This production-skill orientation means that what 
may be called "human-labor-embodied" technology is 
involved and that personnel training (on-the-job 
training of managers, foremen, and workers) is thekey 
mechanism for transferring job-specific skills and 
know-how. Yet training is a form of investment in 
labor, involving risks, especially when local labor is 
foot-loose (i.e. highly mobile between firm.s). 
As 1 emphasized elsewhere, human-labor-
embodied technology and its transfer often tend to be 
given much lower priority than technologies that 
are physically-centered or non-human-centered, such 
3. Svnthesis 
as plant-embodied, input-embodied and 
product/process-embodied technologies, particularly in 
developing countries. Moreover, human-labor-
embodied technology is essentially internalized, not in 
the firm but in individual workers, that is, if workers 
quit, the firm loses such technology or, worse still, 
loses it to its competitors. Hence there is less 
incentives to emphasize the development of human-
labor-embodied technology and much greater incentive 
to solve the productivity problem in terms of 
physically-centered approaches. 
Besides, given the abundant supply of labor 
services in the developing countries which can be 
hired at relatively low wages, it is rather difficult to 
see local workers as suitable objects of investment. 
T. Ozawa, CEDREI-IDRC, Vol.!, 1990 
Studied S:MEs have participated in projects that have entailed the transfer of 
different know hows either separately or in a set. That is, they have shown that they are 
capable of transferring product, process and plant technology to developing countries 
through various combinations according to the demands put to them and their own 
preferences at this respect. To proceed likewise S:MEs have used in practically ail cases 
two channels: blue prints and technical assistance. 
From the gathered evidence it came out that these firms appear to face some 
constraints at the moment of relying mainly in blue prints for transferring their know 
hows intemationally. It was, then, not surprising to find out that technical assistance 
appeared as an another channel extensively used. The interesting aspect to emphasize, 
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is that technicians from recipient finns appear to play a crucial role in man.y of the 
cases studied. SMEs transfer performance was in man.y of them circumscribed to help 
the latter understand the main features of the relevant know hows by receiving them in 
the home country plant. 
On the other hand, those SMEs that had a clear eut definition of the role that 
their affiliates abroad should play, showed that they were in a position of carrying out 
significant efforts in relation to upgrading the recipient's personnel skills. Training of 
the local work force, for example, contrary to what could be expected, was detected in 
various cases of SMEs that decided to put up an equity controlled project. This outcome 




ADAPTATION OF THE IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY 
One of the first ideas that arise, almost intuitively, in relation with the topic of 
the role of smaller finns in the transfer of technology to developing countries, is that 
the know hows of these finns are closer to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in 
the Third World. According to this view, smaller finns established in developed 
countries, as a whole, tend to employ a greater amount of labor per unit of output than 
large finns, and tend to use smaller scale and sirnpler production techniques than the 
latter, features ail of them which seem to be particularly suitable for developing 
countries. 
To tackle this issue its necessary to put forward some clarifications. On the one 
band, the discussion on the suitability of technologies can be carried out with different 
sets of firms as units of analysis. It is possible to compare some basic feature of the 
population of SMEs and of large firms of developed countries - say, their relative 
intensities in the use of labor - and conclude that since the former as a whole employ 
more workers per unit of output, know hows originating from that population are more 
suitable for countries with a large endowment of labor relative to their capital 
endowment. 
A different perspective is to go along with this exercise but only for those firms 
that have actually transferred their know hows to developing countries. In other words, 
to analyze the relative suitability of the technologies of those smaller firms that have 
participated as suppliers of those resources. 
ln this report only the latter are studied. Thus, the reference as to the suitability 
of their assets in terms of developing countries cannot be generalized to the overall 
75 
population of SMEs. More so, as has been shown, there are strong reasons to argue that 
the set of SMEs included in this report is significantly different from the rest of SMEs 
established in developed countries. 
On the other hand, it is important to stress that the concept of adaptation can be 
employed in a starie manner, making reference to the degree of suitability of a given 
technology at a certain moment in time; or to evaluate the significance of the efforts 
made in order to modify a technology. In this second dimension adaptation is defined 
as a process which involves certain activities aimed at transferring a given know how. 
The following analysis deals first with one aspect of the first dimension. A 
second section examines the adaptation efforts made by SMEs and/or recipient firms. 
1. The adaptabilitv of SMEs' technologies 
Scholars that have investigated the adequacy or inadequacy of the production 
technologies employed in developing countries, have given particular attention to the 
issue of scale. In fact, for some of them (Stewart 1978, Merhav 1969) one of the main 
problems that poor countries face is that the production know hows imported from 
developed countries are not suited to their much smaller domestic markets. Typically, 
those technologies require for their efficient utilization the production of goods in a 
much larger scale than local demand can absorb. As a result, in many developing 
countries a low utilization of installed capacity is frequent with the corresponding effect 
in terms of higher unit costs of the products manufactured in them. Thus an interesting 
issue to analyze in this study is to what extent the inadequacy in terms of scale is also 
a feature of the know hows transferred by SMEs. 
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To carry out the referred effort, the analysis was limited only to a group of 
cases: those for which at least 50% of the recipient firms production was explained by 
products or processes manufactured with know hows supplied by the sample SMEs. Its 
obvious that for the other cases this analysis cannot be performed. 
Interviewees from recipient firms were asked to compare the relative volumes 
of output of their companies with the one of their suppliers. The aim was for them to 
provide a gross estimate of orders of magnitude between the production outputs of both 
plants1• They were usually in a good position to perform this exercise since they had 
a good knowledge of the SMEs. 
Table 24 shows that in a large number of cases the production volumes of the 
recipient were considered to be at least 5 rimes smaller than that of the supplier 
(including 34% in which the output differentials were estimated to be at least 10 times 
smaller). In only 8% of the cases for which data was gathered production volumes were 
considered similar among both firms. 
These results put down the aprioristic notion that output differentials between 
SMEs suppliers and recipients would be small. ln fact, these findings suggest that those 
differentials are in line with what is considered to be typical, at least regarding Latin 
American firms. At this respect Katz has indicated, that with very few exceptions, firms 
operating in the latter countries are "between 1-10 per cent of the size of their 
counterparts in developed nations" (Katz 1986). 
To check the consistency of our data base, an analysis was performed as to the 
extent in which observed output differentials were influenced by the organizational form 
1 In case the supplier had more than one plant the comparison was carried out taking into 
consideration the plant in which similar products as the ones manufactured by the recipient's 
plant were produced. 
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that took the venture in recipient developing countries. Table 24 classifies the recipients 
for which the information was available in those that were controlled totally or over 
50% by the SME, those in which the SME had a minority participation and those which 
had signed a licensing agreements with an SME. The results indicate that those 
recipients which were controlled by the SME had volumes of output at least 5 times 
smaller than their suppliers, a proportion not different from the other two categories. 
This implies that the different organizational mode cannot be taken into consideration 
to explain the large output differentials observed in this sub-set of sample cases. 
To deepen the analysis of this issue, Table 24 classifies the recipients according 
to their country of establishment. From it some interesting observations corne out. First 
of ail, those firms placed in Singapore, the smallest domestic market of ail the six 
considered, had the smallest output differentials of ail the 38 cases taken into account. 
More so, 25% of the interviewed firms in that country had similar overall output 
volumes than their suppliers, an outcome that in no other country could be verified. 
Second, although less clearcut, and with the exception of Mexico, a relationship 
between the size of the domestic market and the referred differentials was also detected. 
These findings could be interpreted as suggesting that as has happened with the 
know hows transferred by large transnational corporations, the production technologies 
imported from the SMEs are inadequate for recipient developing countries, given the 
much smaller size of their domestic markets. This would imply that the know hows 
imported are only used partially, that is, significant idle capacity would exist among 
recipient firms. The fact that in the one strongly open economy in the sample output 
differentials were smaller would tend to support this argument. 
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Table 24 
Size of recipient plant scale relative to SME plant scale by organizational form, 
recipient country and recipient's export behavior 
(Nurnber of cases, in percentages) 
Output comparison 
More than 10 9-5 rimes 4-2 rimes Absolute 
rimes smaller smaller smaller Similar Total figures 
Organizational form 
Licensing agreements 56% 22% 22% 100% 9 
Supplier minority joint venture 67% 33% 100% 6 
Supplier majority joint venture 35% 43% 9% 13% 100% 23 
Total 34% 42% 16% 8% 100% 
Absolute figures 13 16 6 3 38 
Recipient country 
Argentina 50% 50% 100% 4 
Brazil 43% 57% 100% 7 
India 25% 38% 38% 100% 8 
Korea 100% 100% 1 
Mexico 83% 17% 100% 6 
Singapore 8% 50% 17% 25% 100% 12 
Total 34% 42% 16% 8% 100% 
Absolute figures 13 16 6 3 38 
Recipient's export behavior 
No exports 42% 42% 17% 100% 12 
Infrequent exporter 43% 43% 14% 100% 7 
Exporter on a regular basis 31% 44% 13% 13% 100% 16 
Total 37% 43% 14% 6% 100% 
Absolute figures 13 15 5 2 35 
A strong sub-utilized capacity would imply relatively high unit costs. Thus, as 
a consequence, a poor export performance would have been expected for those firms 
with large output differentials in relation to their suppliers. To test this relationship 
section 3 of Table 24 has been presented. Contrary to expectations, the diverse 
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production differentials do not appear to be crucial factors to determine a dissimilar 
export behavior. In fact, recipients with large differentials do export regularly only 
marginally less than those with a smaller output gap. 
Thus we arrive at a somehow surprising conclusion. On the one hand, the large 
differences in volumes of output between SMEs and the recipients of their technologies 
suggest that the production know hows of the former can not be presumed to be a priori 
adequate in terms of developing country market sizes. On the other hand, and despite 
there huge differences, recipient firms do not seem prevented from carrying out a 
, 
regular export performance. How can these two - apparently contradictory results -
be sustained? 
If this study would have included only recipient from countries with a highly 
protected (from imports) domestic market, an obvious remark would be that the referred 
result could be explained by the fact that those firms that exported regularly did so only 
-(!.<" 
in a small percentage of their total output; thus allowing them to practice a strategy of 
price differentiation between goods exported and goods sold in the domestic market. But 
the fact that this argument does not hold for Singapore in which firms have to openly 
compete with imports, removes this possibility. 
The explanation that is put forward here is strongly anchored in the peculiarities 
of the modes of production being employed by the studied recipient firms. As recalled 
in the conclusions of the first phase of this research project, (White and Campos 1986), 
the crucial aspect to single out regarding scale differences was the extent of the penalty 
of operating below the minimum efficient point. In other words, the costs gradients that 
a firm faces if departing from the optimum volume of output. It will be argued here that 
since in custom or batch production, the penalty of operating at smaller scales is much 
smaller than in continuous production, recipient firms can operate at much lower 
volumes of output than their suppliers without loosing competitiveness. 
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It is appropriate at this point to present Table 25. In it, the data for a group of 
case studies for which information was collected both from suppliers as well as 
recipients is shown. As it cornes out, 65% of the recipient firms whose mode of 
production was "custom" had imported their know hows from SMEs which employed 
in their plant (or plants) the same mode of production. The other 35% happen to have 
imported their technologies from SMEs which used totally or partially a more 
continuous mode of manufacturing. On the other hand, in those cases in which 
recipients operated their plants in a "batch" or "continuous" mode, their respective 
suppliers employed similar production organization procedures. 
Table 25 
Recipient's mode of production and SME's mode of production 
(Nwnber of cases, in percentages) 
SME's mode 
Recipient's mode of production 
of production Custom order Batch Continuo us Total 
Custom order 65% 25% 47% 
Expected demand 20% 50% 100% 40% 
Both 15% 25% 13% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 






In other words, the data showed that the usual pattern was that either suppliers 
and their respective recipients used the same mode of production or, when this was not 
the case, the latter had to scale down the production process in order to perform through 
a "custom" mode what was manufactured in a more continuous procedure in the SME. 
It is interesting to point out that from the sample only one case was identified in which 
this result was not verified. It has to do with a Japanese subsidiary in Singapore, which 
produces cinematographic equipment in batches while its parent manufactures more 
sophisticated products for specific clients on a "custom" basis. 
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In conclusion, the data revealed that although recipients produced at much 
smaller volumes of output than their suppliers, this fact seems not to have limited the 
former's capacity to compete intemationally. The explanation to this finding seems to 
have to do with the relative greater flexibility of the mode of production typically 
employed by Sl\ffis so to allow for a significant reduction in output levels in the 
recipients without an equivalent increase in average costs. In tum, this seems plausible 
given that custom production is a highly skilled labor intensive mode, and that wages 
in recipient developing countries are lower than in Sl\ffis home countries. In addition, 
most sample Sl\ffis, engage in R&D efforts which constitute a fix cost whereas 
recipients competitiveness is enhanced by the fact that payments for imported 
technology are usually tied up to their sales value. 
2. Adaptation efforts 
The cases studied included different types of experiences regarding efforts aimed 
at adapting the Sl\ffis know hows to the host country conditions. In this section product 
and process adaptations will be analyzed separately. 
a) Product adaptations 
Supplier firms as well as recipients were asked if the products for which the 
technology was imported were of the same design as the ones being manufactured (at 
present or in the recent past) in the home country. A significant majority - of up to 
70% - provided an affirmative answer. 
This result is not surprising if it is recalled that the main objective of many of 
the transactions studied here has to do with the replication of the products manufactured 
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in the home countries. In other words, for many SMEs and recipients there was no 
intention of introducing modifications in the imported designs since they wanted to sell 
the respective products as equivalents of the ones produced by the SME. At the same 
time, the absence of an effort to modify the products may simply entail that they were 
a priori adaptable to the host country conditions. 
Of those that gave a negative response, the overriding majority made reference 
as to small adaptations that were "imposed" by the circumstances of the recipient 
country/firm. Among them the most frequent had to do with the need to modify certain 
specifications of the product in order to make it more adaptable to the conditions of the 
host country demand. Typical of these were the modifications introduced in a light earth 
moving equipment by an Argentine firm which had celebrated a licensing agreement 
with an ltalian SME according to which the product designs were imported. The 
changes were mainly aimed at making the equipment more robust and allowing the 
customer to operate it without a too close technical assistance on the part of the 
manufacturer. 
The other frequent cause that led to the introduction of product adaptations was 
related to the need to take under consideration the recipient country supply conditions 
in relation with certain inputs or components. For example, a German manufacturer of 
brak:e and clutch-linings used in a joint-venture in India asbestos as lining material, 
which is quite coIIirnon in this country. In Germany, on the contrary, this material can't 
be used since it is forbidden by law (Kumar and Steinmann 1990, see also Box F). 
Of course, the nature of the manufacturing equipment used in the recipient also 
led to the introduction of adaptations. In this respect the usual finding was that the 
existence at the recipient plant of much less sophisticated equipment than at the SMEs 
plant, forced the introduction of some changes in the design of the product. 
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As a whole, the impression conveyed from the cases studied was that only minor 
modifications were carried out. In fact, in only a few cases of firms that produced 
custom-order goods, recipients indicated that they had to perform not insignificant 
changes in the imported designs. For the rest, as was mentioned, the usual outcome was 
that SMEs and recipients alike tried not to modify products in order to assure a given 
level of quality or the utilization of a given trade mark. 
BoxF 
Product Design Changes in Brazil 
[ ... ] the availability of existing products is the 
main motive for product design changes. The 
availability may be understood both from the 
qualitative and the quantitative point of view. 
From the qualitative point of view, ail the firms in 
the sample had problems with the type of inputs 
available. In some cases those inputs did not exist in 
the Brazilian market. On the other band, ü they 
existed, they did not always have the same 
specifications as those originally established by the 
SME to produce in the counny of origin. Product 
design had to be adapted to produce with local inputs. 
This process, also called "nationalization", could imply 
important adaptations in product design. 
Thus, it was possible to observe that the changes 
in product design are, in a certain way, related to the 
market strategy of the subsidiaries, and more 
specifically, to the exporting activity. Therefore, when 
b) Process adaptations 
the subsidiary was more oriented towards the local 
market, there where less restrictions for product design 
changes than when it was oriented towards the 
external market (otherwise it would deviate from the 
quality standards set by the home firm itself). The 
importation of critical components from the home 
firms was a means of the firm for minimizing the 
impact of the conditions of the local supply market on 
the product design selected to produce in the counny. 
From the quantitative point of view, what happens 
sometimes is that an input may be available in the 
market, but can not be purchased in volumes 
appropriate for a small or medium firm. This issue is 
related to the high concentration levels found in some 
sectors producing basic inputs, as for example, steel. 
Given these economic problems, the subsidiaries tend 
to modify product designs using other inputs. 
A. Fleury, CEDREI-IDRC Vol.Il, 1990. 
A subset of recipient firms manufactured most of their products according to 
know hows imported from the SME. In these cases suppliers and recipients were asked 
as to the extent in which the process know hows used in the latter were similar to the 
ones employed in the former. 
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i) Equipment 
Regarding the type of equipment used by recipient firms, two main aspects were 
singled out for investigation. The first one deals with the extent in which the one they 
employed was similar or not from the one used at the SME home country plant. The 
second one has to do with the national origin of the equipment used at the recipient's 
plant. 
On 36 cases for which data was obtained, 39% replied that the recipient firm 
used a different equipment from the one of the SME. The usual comment that followed 
this answer was that recipient firms in developing countries had a much smaller output, 
and produced a larger variety of parts and components in-house, and for these reasons 
simpler, frequently universal capital goods were preferable. Sorne respondents also 
added that equipment used by the SME required a sophisticated maintenance which was 
not possible (or was too costly) in recipient developing countries, and that led them to 
choose less automated, easy to repair machinery. 
Those recipients which exported regularly tended to use similar equipment than 
the SME, while those that did not export in more than half the cases studied declared 
they were employing different type of capital goods than the SME. This result is 
explained by the necessity on the part of the recipient firm and the SME alike, of 
assuring certain standards regarding product specifications when the goods were 
manufactured to be sold in world markets. At the same time, it is also associated with 
the extent of control of the SME. In fact, those recipients which had celebrated 
licensing agreements with the SME tended to use different equipment in a larger 
proportion than those that were equity controlled by the SME. 
In relation with Uie national origin of the equipment used by the recipients, the 
data indicates that as a whole in 60% of the cases it was purchased mainly or 
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exclusively in the host country, while in the remaining 40% of the cases it was 
imported, mostly from the SMEs home country. 
As could be expected, significant differences emerged according to the host 
country. As Table 26 shows, Singaporean firms imported most of their equipment 
requirements from the SMEs' home countries, while the opposite occurred with the 
other recipients (leaving the Korea one case aside). This result has to do with the 
existence in the latter of a developed capital goods industry with the capacity to provide 
equipment which suits well the recipients needs; and with the existence in them of 
protective measures regarding imports for those capital goods which are produced 
locally. 
From the developed country studies carried out for this project (CEDREI-IDRC, 
Vol 1, 1990) it emerges that cases with the participation of, say, Japanese SMEs, led to 
the purchase by the recipients of Japanese equipment in a somewhat higher proportion 
than in the other country cases. Unfortunately it is not possible from the limited 
evidence gathered to distinguish to what extent this is a behavior determined by the 
national origin of the SMEs or by other factors related with the studied cases. As Table 
26 indicates, the export orientation of the recipients appears as a relatively significant 
variable to explain difference in equipment purchasing practices. Those firms which had 
a regular export behavior had imported their equipment mainly from the SME home 
country. Again, the desire to guarantee a given level of standardization and quality 
performance of the recipients manufactured products has probably influenced heavily 
this outcome. 
Finally, the data indicates that the organizational form of the recipient has a 
bearing on the origin of the equipment. In fact, equity controlled ventures in 50% of the 
cases purchased their capital goods from the home country while the corresponding 
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figure for licensing agreements was 25%. This outcome suggests that SMEs rely on the 
source of equipment they know best. 
Table 26 
National origin of the purchased equipment by host country, 
export behavior of recipient firm and organizational form 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Origin of the equipment 
Majority Majority 
100% host host country SME's Another Absolu te 
country rest: SME's rest: host country Total figures 
Host country 
Argentina 67% 33% 100% 3 
Brazil 67% 33% 100% 6 
lndia 13% 63% 13% 13% 100% 8 
Korea 100% 100% 1 
Mexico 25% 50% 25% 100% 4 
Singapore 12% 88% 100% 8 
Export behavior of recipient 
No experts 33% 50% 17% 100% 12 
Infrequent exporter 50% 17% 17% 17% 100% 6 
Exporter in a regular basis 8% 25% 67% 100% 12 
Organizational form 
Licensing agreements 25% 50% 25% 100% 8 
Foreign minority J. V. 33% 33% 17% 17% 100% 6 
Foreign majority 
J.V. and subsidiaries 25% 25% 50% 100% 16 
Total 27% 33% 37% 3% 100% 30 
Absolute figures 8 10 11 1 
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ii) Adaptations in plant designs 
As was pointed out in a previous Chapter a group of cases studied included the 
transfer of plant designs. The sample results indicate that exactly in half of those cases 
the plant designs were modified, while in the other half the imported plant designs were 
not al tered. 
The analysis showed a strong association between the SMEs prevailing mode of 
production and their tendency to introduce modifications in the recipient plant designs. 
As revealed by Table 27 modifications were adopted in 71 % of the cases in which the 
mode of production of the supplier corresponded to the category which has been 
labelled as "expected demand", and only in 33% of the cases the prevailing mode was 
the manufacturing of goods on a custom order basis. 
As was referred to in the previous section of this Chapter, a significant 
proportion of SME, which operated according to the former mode of production had 
transferred their know hows to recipients which employed the latter mode. In other 
words, those SMEs had to adequate their respective know hows. On the contrary, ail 
those SMEs that used a custom-order mode had transferred their know hows to firms 
that employed the same organizational mode. 
But in addition, it is important to emphasize that the degree of technical 
flexibility is not similar among both modes. Production for an expected demand usually 
involves a certain physical lay out of the equipment, a certain method for the inflow and 
outflow of inputs and goods, etc. so as to optimize the economic results of the 
operation. It is frequently impossible to alter such equipment distribution and flow of 
materials without making an important technical effort or risking a high economic cost. 
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Table 27 
Modification or the plant design by the recipient, by supplier's mode or production, 
Host country, export behavior or recipient firm and organi7.ational form 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Plant Design 
Absolute 
Modified Same Total figures 
SME's mode of production 
Custom order 33% 67% 100% 15 
Expected demand 71% 29% 100% 14 
Total (absolute figures) 15 14 29 
Orgarùzational form 
Licensing agreements and foreign 
minority joint ventures 57% 43% 100% 23 
Foreign majority 
Joint ventures and subsidiaries 35% 65% 100% 20 
Total (absolute figures) 20 23 43 
Host country 
Brazil 67% 33% 100% 9 
Mexico 63% 37% 100% 8 
lndia 70% 30% 100% 10 
Singapore 8% 92% 100% 13 
Korea 33% 67% 100% 3 
Total (absolute figures) 20 23 43 
Export behavior of recipient 
No exports 60% 40% 100% 5 
Infrequent exporter 43% 57% 100% 7 
Exporter in a regular basis 25% 75% 100% 16 
In contrast, plant layouts are much more flexible and adaptable to different 
conditions in the case of custom order production. It cornes as no surprise then, to 
verify that those cases of the latter type did not require particular modifications to be 
put forward when their respective plant designs were transplanted to recipient 
developing countries. 
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As could be expected, the higher or lower propensity to modify the plant design 
was associated with the organizational form of the technology transfer. Modifications 
were more frequent in the case of non equity controlled ventures than in those which 
were equity controlled. The existence of a manufacturing facility in some of the former 
cases and thus the need to adequate these imported know hows to the constraints 
imposed by that fact, were one factor that played a role. But the main explanations have 
to do with the nature of the host countries and the export orientation of the recipient 
firms. 
As Table 27 shows, most projects in Singapore did not require modifications to 
be introduced while the opposite occurred for those ventures carried out in Brazil, lndia 
and Mexico. These results are explained in part by the need to adequate the operation 
of manufacturing plants in the latter countries to the restrictions imposed by the type 
of equipment that was installed, the characteristics of the inputs and components, the 
degree of vertical integration needed, etc. Typically, in those countries these conditions 
varied significantly from the ones that prevailed in home countries. In Singapore, in 
contrast, the openness of its economy allowed Sl\1Es to transfer plant designs without 
the need to perform adaptations in relation with those aspects. 
The export orientation of the recipient finn appeared as another important 
variable which explained clifferences regarding plant modifications. Albeit the much 
smaller number of observations it can be seen in Table 27 that while those 
modifications were introduced only in 25% of the cases of recipients which were 
engaged in regular exports the proportion increased up to 60% in those recipient firms 
that did not export. 
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3. Synthesis 
Contrary to what could be expected, the differences in output volumes between 
the SMEs plants and the recipient firms plants that produced their goods using the 
former production know hows were very large. Notwithstanding, this fact did not imply 
that the latter firms were necessarily affected in their capacity to compete 
intemationally. The suggested explanation has to do with the greater flexibility of 
production technologies controlled by SMEs, and particularly with the fact that they 
operated manufacturing technologies for which scale economies are relatively 
unimportant. 
The cases studied showed that as a whole SMEs and recipient firms alike did not 
carry out significant efforts towards adapting the imported know hows. Plant 
technologies related with the manufacturing of goods for an expected demand appear 
to require relatively more eff0rts towards adapting them to the recipient country 
conditions, in comparison with the ones that were needed when those know hows had 
to do with the production of custom made products. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY BY 
INITIATIVE-TAKING FIRMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. The customarv view on technology transfer. 
At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s concern mounted amongst developing 
countries due to the financial cost, and social and political implications of the 
acquisition of foreign technology .1 From within the analytical framework prevailing 
at that time2 a sort of stylized behavioral pattern can be recognized, according to 
which: a) international technology supply was considered to be dominated by mainly 
US-based oligopolistic transnational corporations (followed by Western European and 
Japanese firms) controlling their particular product/technology market segments 
concerned; b) technology transfer was seen as part of their broader strategies for global 
expansion through which they tied in high levels of sales of intermediate and capital 
goods for the manufacturing of particular products; and c) technology transfer 
1 Thus, the issue of technology transfer was identified and discussed as a problem 
area in its own right. See the pioneer studies done by Cooper and Sercovich (1971), 
UNCTAD (1972) and Cooper (1974). 
2 A set of empirical studies involving several industrial branches in Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, the Andean Pact country members, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, South 
Korea, Philippines and lndonesia revealed that contracts and licensing agreements 
between foreign suppliers and Third World recipient firms held restrictive clauses, 
excessive direct charges for the technology acquired in terms of payments for patents, 
royalties and license fees together with a great deal of transfer pricing practices. These 
countries case studies were conducted by the UNCT AD Technology Transfer Division 
and are summarized in UNCTAD (1975). Together with Vaitsos (1974) study on 
transnational corporations and technology transactions in Latin America, they are 
considered the most influential in shaping the national technology policies of many 
Third World countries during the 1970s and part of the 1980s. 
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transactions were meant to almost exclusively engage transnational corporations 
- allegedly possessing the knowledge and the experience, and facing zero or trivial 
marginal costs in transferring vis a vis the costs of generating this "public good"; -
with either existing sales agents, affiliates, new subsidiaries or independent licensees, 
seen as lacking any significant expertise both in acquiring or creating technology. In 
other words, the international market of technology was characterized by a very 
significant imbalance of bargaining power between active and dominating transnational 
corporations and passive and subordinated recipients. 
No wonder then, most of Third World countries' policy-making efforts were 
aimed at imposing reductions in the level of equity in domestic firms that foreign firms 
were allowed to own, as well as at promoting the acquisition of technology via non-
equity relationship such as licensing agreements, technical service agreements or 
machinery direct purchase contracts with firms. Policy strategies also included the 
setting up of legislation bodies to regulate all technology transfer contracts (Hoffman 
and Girvan 1990). 
The customary view on the North-South technology transfer process has 
neglected the recipients' role in developing countries. Technology importers in these 
countries have been considered usually as passive recipients, and even when these firms 
were independent units they were meant to lack any significant technological capability. 
Therefore, technology transfer transactions were misleadingly conceived as a one-way 
directed flow in which the initiative, experience and knowledge were supposed to 
exclusively belong to the suppliers. 
More recently, however, technology transfer studies have brought recipients 
firms' strategies and management of technology transactions much more clearly into the 
picture. In particular sales agents or customers have been acknowledged for their 
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considerable influence on SMEs' decision of moving abroad.3 In a fi.rst study conducted 
by CEDRE!, for example, results revealed that an outside proposal was the origin of the 
dealings in about 75% of the 32 technology transfer operations surveyed between 
developed country-based SMEs and metalworking firms in Argentina and Brazil.4 
Even more important, however, was to learn that previously un-related domestic 
recipient firms actually approaching the SMEs in their own countries was the most 
frequently reported situation. In a number of these initiative-taking recipients, a well 
defined strategy of technology acquisition including the searching and selection of 
SMEs in the international market, the identification of their own specific needs, and the 
exploration and negotiation with other alternative suppliers, were detected. It was 
further concluded that the local recipients' active role was not only crucial for 
influencing the SMEs' decisions of going abroad but also for helping them in the 
transfer tasks, for which the SMEs were very often rather unexperienced (White and 
Campos 1986). 
Recipient firms from other developing countries presented a similar behavioral 
pattern, as reported by several research studies. From a research involving 41 British 
firms which had transferred technology to Indian firms from mid 1970s to mid 1980s 
approximately, it was found that local recipients were the driving force behind the 
process of technology transfer to that country. It was established that in the majority 
3 SMEs suppliers of parts and components for both the automotive and electronic 
industries "dragged out" abroad by their TNCs customers, are one of the most quoted 
examples of internationalization of SMEs by outside proposals (Newbould et al. 1978, 
UNCTAD 1982, Onida 1985, Ozawa 1985, Bertin 1986, Balcet 1984, Enos and Park 
1988). 
4 During 1984 and 1985, direct interviews were conducted to analyze a sample of 
32 technology transfer cases by SMEs from 8 developed countries to Argentine and 
Brazilian-based metalworking firms, mainly capital goods manufacturers (White and 
Campos 1986). 
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of the cases the technology had been pulled in by the lndian firms instead of had been 
pushed there by the British suppliers. The study claimed that in about two-thirds of the 
sample agreements the Indian firms had taken the initiative in acquiring the technology 
in order to meet particular problems or opportunities which it faced in the Indian 
market. Moreover, the survey stressed that this active behavior on the part of the local 
recipients did not reflect a pattern whereby the suppliers had "ventriloquized" a demand 
for their own technology on the part of firms in lndia to which they were in some way 
already linked. It was argued that in only about one-fifth of the sample agreements was 
the Indian firm already a financial affiliate of the British supplier, and in less than 10% 
of the cases was it the sales agent for the supplier's existing exports to India. 
Furthermore, by taking account of all the agreements in which the suppliers had been 
involved, less than half were entered into by firms with some kind of prior 
relationship. 5 
Additional evidence on the technology transaction dealings of Indian firms have 
reinforced these findings. Based on information on foreign collaborations officially 
approved between 1977 and 1983, and on questionnaires and interviews involving some 
211 technology-importing Indian firms, a more recent research ratified that most of the 
technology transferred into this country was met through the initiative of the Indian 
firms. A higher level of initiativeness was also recorded as 93% of the technology 
agreements were said to had been initiated by local recipients (Alam 1988). 
5 This is not to say that purposeful strategies on the part of the foreign suppliers had 
no influence at ail on the technology transactions entered by the Indian recipients (Bell 
and Scott-Kemmis 1988). 
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2. A "non-ventriloouized" demand for technology. 
This study, based on a sample of technology transfer dealings from different 
countries, has again found a remarkable degree of initiativeness on the part of recipients 
in acquiring technology. In fact, almost 90% of 52 pre-existing local recipient firms 
reported to have taken the initiative to search out for a possible supplier, while only 4 
of them (8%) attributed the initiative to the foreign SME supplier. In the remaining 2 
cases the initiative was shared between both recipient and supplier .6 
Moreover, the data indicates that the active behavior of this group of initiative-
taking firms was not the reflection of any sort of "ventriloquization", that is, a process 
by which the foreign suppliers had induced a demand for their own technology. First, 
prior to entering into partnership with foreign SMEs about 84% of initiative-taking local 
recipient firms were domestically-owned. On the other hand, the ownership pattern of 
the technology transactions revealed that only one of the initiative-taking pre-existing 
recipient firms got involved in a foreign supplier majority equity-owned venture. 
Conversely, about 85% of pre-existing recipient firms who actually took the initiative 
entered into licensing agreements with the foreign suppliers. Thus, the important point 
to stress is that the local initiative not only was vital to pull in the imported technology 
but also heavily detennined the ownership pattern of the technology transactions. 
6 Initiativeness was evenly distributed throughout the different recipient countries. 
Values for local initiative rose from 80% in South Korea to 100% in Argentina. Though 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India and South Korea do differ in terms of their degree of 
industrial maturity, recent economic success and political stability, they all share a past 
of active import-substituting industrialization policies with tariff protection and 
restrictions and regulations conceming both direct foreign investment and imports of 
technology. In such a context, many recipients built-up significant strength and expertise 
to deal in technology. Furthermore, most of the few foreign initiative-driven cases were 
detected amongst recipient firms employing less than 1 OO people. Finally, local initiative 
prevailed in almost all different industrial branches. 
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Second, and more significant, almost two-thirds of this group of initiative-taking 
pre-existing recipient firms reported to have had no previous import or export links with 
the foreign supplier of technology. What's more, half of them informed to have had no 
previous links either commercial, persona! or of other nature with the SME. 
Initiative-taking pre-existing recipient firms, on the other hand, were capable 
enough of translating their technological needs in a demand for specific know-hows. 
It appeared that they had motives of their own to pull in the technology imported from 
abroad. They had to meet the challenges coming from specific situations and 
opportunities generated in the highly specialized "niches", created and controlled by 
them. Almost 65% of initiative-taking recipients reported to supply at least more than 
30% of their respective markets, and nearly 45% of them declared to control more than 
50% of total supply of their product markets. 
Basically, their technology transactions were aimed at reinforcing their control 
of their local markets. Thus, it cornes out a no surprise that in about 62% of the cases 
the technology they acquired was not already in operation in the local market, and was 
meant to allow them to secure a leading position in it. Moreover, and typically of most 
of the studied companies operating under the protection of high tariff barriers in 
oligopolistic markets, the know-hows acquired were expected to help widening the 
advantages they locally enjoyed based in non-price factors of competition, such as 
trade-marks, quality and after sale services, instead of allowing them to reduce 
production costs or initiate export activities. As indicated by Table 28, strengthening 
their domestic competitive position, diversifying their product mix, and following local 
customers' suggestions were the motives which most frequently led initiative-taking 
recipient firms to introduce the technology imported from SMEs. 
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Table 28 
Initiative-taking recipients' reasons for introducing the technology 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Reasons 
Strengthening competitive position 
Diversification of product lines 
Indication from a major local customer 
Introduction of changes in the production process 




















"Animal export spirits" were absent in the exposed motives for locally 
introducing the foreign technology. Whilst a mere one-quarter of initiative-taking 
recipients exported on a regular basis, more than 40% of initiative-taking firms revealed 
to have no export activity whatsoever and other 34% of them have done it 
occasionally. About 70% of these 11 regular exporting companies reported an export 
to global sales ratio of less than 50%. Just 3 consistent exporting firms reported to have 
sold more than 50% of their merchandise abroad. A similar pattern was obtained as for 
the share of total exports represented by the products for which the technology was 
actually transferred. 
3. Technological capabilities of initiative-taking recipient firms. 
About 59% of initiative-taking recipient firms had accumulated a rich previous 
experience by prior entering either into licensing agreements, joint-ventures or both. In 
addition, the cases studied did not need extemal assistance to individualize and contact 
their foreign technology supplier as they appeared to perfectly know which partner they 
were looking for. It seems that they invested resources in learning how to identify, 
negotiate and acquire technology from abroad as 98% of them reported to have had 
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neither official nor private assistance to individualize and contact their foreign suppliers 
of technology. 
Almost 70% of these finns knew that their S:ME partner held leading positions 
in both their market of origin and internationally for the product or technology involved. 
Table 29 shows that nearly half of initiative-taking recipients felt that the S:ME's 
international prestige in terms of reliability, quality and users' experience in their 
specific product and process technologies, led them to make their choice. Other 23% 
of them selected their prior foreign commercial partners as their foreign suppliers of 
technology. The third reason most frequently mentioned (11 % of recipient firms) was 
that the S:ME offered the best dealing conditions. "Appropriateness" of the know-hows 
transferred, better suitability of S:ME products to local demand patterns, simplicity of 
the manufacturing process and repair tasks, lower imported inputs requirements, faster 
delivery of the required technology, and flexibility of transfer conditions were also 
reported in several cases. 
Table 29 
Domestic initiative-taking recipients' reasons 
for selecting the foreign technology supplier 
(Number of cases, in percentages) 
Reasons Percentages 
SMEs' international prestige 48% 
Previous links 23% 
SMEs offered better dealing conditions 11% 
Outside proposa! 5% 













It will be argued here that recipients' initiativeness is somehow related to the 
technology-generating capabilities they developed, being their apprenticeship in 
international technology dealings a relevant part of them.7 Their conscious "learning 
by doing" practices8 might have included a sort of "learning by licensing" whereby as 
part of the same process of adapting, improving and generating technological skills of 
their own these firms ended up leaming how to negotiate technology agreements in the 
international market. 
Newly-created technology by recipient firms in developing countries has heavily 
drew on the need to adapt, adjust or improve a particular imported product or process, 
but also as a consequence of the generation of technological packages of their own9• 
Either by carrying out problem-solving activities - related to the scaling-down of the 
facilities, and the availability of inputs, parts and components, and equipment - for the 
operation of existing plants; or by doing trouble-shooting tasks related to the setting up 
of new production capacity and also brand new equipment; or by modifying product 
features to reflect local needs and preferences; or even by resetting input specifications 
to allow the utilization of domestically available endowments, several firms in 
7 Evidence presented by Erber (1982), Bell and Scott-Kemmis (1988), White and 
Campos (1986), Alam (1988), and Ernst and O'Connor (1989) have also contributed to 
suggest that several recipient firms in developing countries may have generated a 
broader and richer capacity to search and negotiate for the imported technology than 
originally assumed. 
8 This expression goes beyond the "learning-by-doing" or "learning curve" concepts, 
where "learning" is a mere function of the accumulated experience in performing 
production overtime. "Conscious leaming" includes any mean by which a firm -within 
a specific society and a given economic environment- purposely increases its capacity 
to manage technology and to implement technical change. See Bell (1984) for a 
meaningful discussion on the concept of "learning". 
9 See Katz (1987) for a thorough review of case studies on "learning" practices by 
developing country-based recipient firms. Strong evidence is provided to support the 
endogenous nature of the forces inducing the generation of new technical knowledge. 
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developing countries have developed the ability of assimilating and adapting foreign 
technologies to make them better suited to local circumstances. 
AU these "minor" incremental technical changes have been their answer to 
markets which are smaller, frequently more protected, where business concentration is 
much higher and the competition weaker, with more pronounced imperfections, 
distortions in technical information and skill shortages than those respectively prevailing 
in developed countries. 
Undoubtedly, such profile is clearly different from the one depicted in the 
traditional technology transfer literature in which developing country-based firms were 
supposed to lack any significant expertise in creating technology and were considered 
as anything but passive recipients of foreign blue-prints. These "minor" idiosyncratic 
modifications - e.g. adaptive bottleneck-breaking and capacity-stretching efforts in 
existing plants, improvements in the use of by-products, life-extending adjustments for 
equipment, adaptations to changes in raw material sources, and alterations in the product 
mix - have stressed the imperfect understanding and limited imitability of 
technologies.10 
They have also broadened the extent of the concept of technical change for 
developing country-based firms' "learning" practices can not be treated as a mere clones 
of technological search efforts undertaken by manufacturing companies in developed 
economies since their own technological search efforts have been very sensitive to the 
environment where they operated and very idiosyncratic. Even more important perhaps 
they have made apparent that although pieces of knowledge can be acquired from 
outside the firm, the ability and capabilities to make use of them have to be purposely 
10 As Nelson (1979) has pointed out " ... manufacturing technology is characterized 
by a considerable element of tacitness, difficulties in imitation and teaching, and 
uncertainty regarding what modifications will work and what will not". 
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built-in by recipient finns through the funding of indigenous technological efforts and 
human capital formation. 11 
BoxG 
Responding to Import Competition in Korea 
Company C, with employment of 20 people, 
specializes in industrial bumers. Bumers are very 
much differentiated by their use and their fuels. Thus, 
each firm specializes in some segment of the market 
In addition. the share of imports is high, approaching 
70% of the total sales. 
In addition. the domestic market is too small to 
achieve economies of scale. In other words, domestic 
manufacturers produce on an order basis while foreign 
manufactures produce according to the batch mode. 
Company C accumulated teclmology by imitating 
foreign products. But the level of teclmology was not 
high enough to compete with imports and it lost its 
market share to imports, especially to high-pressure 
oil-bumers. Thus, they seek foreign technology to 
strengthen their competitive position. An American 
company was contacted, which is a leading firm in the 
U.S. bumers industry. 
The American company wanted to have a Korean 
partner to compete with a J apanese firm which had 
been a licensee of the firm. By having an arrangement, 
in some product lines the licensor can utilize the 
licensee as a sales agent of their many other products. 
Because the main motive of the licensor is to 
strengthen marketing channels in Korea, the royalty 
for the technology was kept minimal, at 1.7% of sales, 
without any other payment However, exports are 
prohibited for 3 years following the contract. The 
licensor does not want to have the same experience 
that had with the Japanese firm. 
The teclmology transfer involved mainly sending 
drawings and wrinen teclmical information. Company 
C had the capability to understand and modify the 
drawings. For example, a change in the fuel tank 
capacity was made by the licensee without the help of 
the licensor. Company C was also able to apply the 
licensed teclmology to other products. Company C 
also acts as domestic sales agent for the licensor. 
Won-Young Lee, CEDREl-IDRC, Vol.II, 1990. 
11 R&D expenditure by firms in some more advanced developing countries was also 
related to the observed growth in their overall productivity, and to the increase in both 
their industrial and technology exports. Econometric testing applied by Katz (1978) to 
several Argentine-located industrial firms revealed that their accumulated flow of 
expenditure on R&D activities mostly directed to carrying out "minor" changes, was 
statistically significant as an explanatory variable of the observed growth in their overall 
productivity. Dahlman and Fonseca (1978) examining the technological history of an 
integrated Brazilian steel producer, have also emphasized the importance of "minor" 
technical changes in the observed gains in factor productivity both at the finn and 
industry level. Regarding the link between the growing path of some more-advanced 
developing countries' ex ports of manufactures and technology, and the accumulated 
flow of R&D activities directed to fund "minor" technical changes, see Katz and Ablin 
(1978-a) and (1978-b); and Lall (1984). 
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Most of initiative-taking firms stuclied in this research were found to have a very 
active technology-creating behavior. Almost three-quarters of them reported to carry 
out R&D activities. Also, for half of this group of firms the number of professionals 
involved in these tasks represented more than 4% of their global human resources. In 
the same vein, and also at odds with the customary view referred above, the :finclings 
of this study contribute to emphasize that these recipient firms did have to generate their 
own knowledge concomitantly to be able to acquire and use imported technical 
knowledge. In fact, despite 67% of initiative-taking firms considered the products 
corresponding to the technology transferred of the same design as those manufactured 
back in their countries of origin, about 70% of these companies actually considered they 
had to introduce improvements and adaptations to them. Scale problems and difficulties 
related to the local availability of inputs, parts and components, and equipment were the 
most pointed factors behind the recipient firms' efforts to make the imported 
technologies better suited to local circumstances12• 
Domestic initiative-taking recipients also helped the rather unexperienced foreign 
suppliers in the actual transfer tasks. About 85% of initiative-taking recipient firms sent 
their local technicians to the Sl\1Es' plants to get familiar with the acquired know-hows 
and to facilitate the process of technology transfer as a whole. They not only developed 
the ability and skills to search for and acquire imported technical knowledge but also 
they helped making the actual transferring tasks. Almost 60% of these :firms described 
the role of their own technicians in the transfer process as "very significant", while 
other 36% considered it as "significant". 
121t is also worth underlying that although a mere 21 % of foreign SMEs suppliers 
actually collaborated to carry out these modifications and improvements, they were 
considered successful by 72% of consulted SMEs to the extent that they gave their 
agreement to put them into practice. 
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4. Svnthesis 
Up to date, and with a few exceptions, research on the North-South technology 
transfer process has underlined the supplier firms' active and aggressive behavior. 
Recipient companies' place in this process has been neglected or described as passive 
or merely dependent. This Chapter has shown conclusively that the referred view is 
undoubtedly inappropriate at least as regard the intemationalization process of SMEs. 
In fact, the present survey has found that in a significant number of cases, SMEs' 
technology transfer operations have been to a large extent dependent on the experience 
and capabilities of domestic recipient firms. 
In other words, and contrary to the usual picture on the intemationalization 
process portrayed in most of the received literature, domestic firms in host developing 
countries emerged as significant actors in the transfer of know-hows by SMEs. They 
actually, in a large majority of ventures, contacted the SME and invited it to participate 
in a given deal, and contributed with their own technical skills and qualified human 
resources to import and assimilate the know-hows. To put it bluntly, these firms 
performed a vital role in the process and compensated the lack of experience and 




PO LICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings and lessons that corne out from this study go beyond the realm of 
"academia". We think that a series of suggestions as to new approaches and policies 
regarding the international transfer of technology can be derived from the experiences 
analyzed. This section is devoted to a presentation of some of the referred suggestions 
with the expectation that the effort so far conducted can be also translated into ways 
and means according to which developing countries can make more efficient use of an 
up to now largely untapped "reservoir" of technological assets. 
1. The potential of SMEs' contribution 
The first point to emphasize from the outset, is that this research has showed that 
small and medium sized firms based in developed countries are in a position of 
transferring their know hows to developing countries. This outcome was far from 
obvious when this IDRC funded project began. More so, the first reaction of some 
colleagues when the project was being designed was of skepticism as to the possibility 
of getting off ground a research endeavor which implied identifying and surveying a 
significant number of cases of SMEs with operations in developing countries. 
As has been recalled in previous sections of this report, few studies had been 
made prior to the present one that have focused on nontraditional sources of technology 
from the view point of developing countries. The main approach to technology transfer 
issues is still one based on the assumption that large transnational corporations (TNC's) 
are the only agents really worth taking into consideration in that respect by the above 
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mentioned countries. ln a way then, the first broad policy implication that cornes out 
from this report, is that SMEs constitute sources of know hows which developing 
countries should take seriously into consideration. 
Furthermore, the fact that an agent which was up to now excluded from the 
perceived possibilities at hand for developing countries, has demonstrated that can 
perform a role in the international mobilization of technical knowledge, leads to the 
conclusion that the international market for those assets is not so constrained as is 
frequently portrayed. ln tum, this means that the traditional perspective according to 
which developing countries look at the supply market for technology, should be 
significantly altered in order for them to understand that they will gain much in the 
process if they broaden that view to include agents such as SMEs. 
Putting SMEs into the picture of the international market of technology implies 
for developing countries adding thousands and thousands of firms to the "roster" of 
potential suppliers. Just to give an idea of orders of magnitude, its appropriate to recall 
that the total number of manufacturing Sl\ffis in the United States approached 340.000 
in 1982. The significance of this figure is better understood if one recalls that most of 
the literature on transnational corporations has been based on a very limited number of 
firms. For instance, Vernon's (1971) influential study on the subject, singled out 187 
U .S. manufacturing firms as pertaining to his definition of a multinational enterprise. 
It would be, of course, a gross simplification to think that taking more seriously 
into consideration the potential role of SMEs means visualizing their contribution in 
terms of substituting the one performed by large firms, and particularly, that of 
transnational corporations. In fact, in many situations, SMEs and large firms do not 
compete between them since they are established in different sectors, or the former 
operate as subcontractors of the latter. 
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2. "Autonomous" and recipient-countrv-driven SMEs 
At the same time, it is important to recall - as this report has showed - that 
regarding the transfer of know hows to developing countries it is possible to 
differentiate among various types of strategies of SMEs involvement. Sorne of them are 
similar to that depicted in the literature on TNCs, while others are typical of SMEs. An 
important conclusion is that learning to distinguish among those categories helps to 
design useful policies to deal with those firms. 
Sorne SMEs prior to their operation in developing countries could be correctly 
labelled "SMEs multinationals". These firms differ from typical TNCs in the absolute 
value of their sales, assets or employees, but operate in several countries as the latter 
do, have a strategy of intemationalization which includes a division of labor among its 
different affiliates, carry on efforts of R&D at its headquarters and transmit those results 
to its subsidiaries according to a worldwide strategy, proceed to take the maximum 
possible benefit of intra-affiliate trade, etc. It was also demonstrated that some of these 
firms are world leaders in their product segments and are responsible of a large 
percentage of their total industry sales. 
On the other hand, this study found that SMEs with few antecedents as regards 
intemationalization did also participate in ventures in developing countries, but usually 
with the help of a preexistent recipient firm. Many of those SMEs had not a clearly 
defined strategy as to their international expansion and reacted to an outside proposai. 
Although these two ideal types clearly simplify the variegated phenomenon studied, 
they are a useful departing point to organize the presentation that follows. 
Those SMEs with an autonomous drive towards intemationalization become 
interested in operating in developing countries because of factors which have also been 
identified in studies on TNCs. It was shown, for example, that for some of them the 
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risks of loosing an important export market, or of establishing themselves in high 
growth economies, or of operating in a large close economy which cannot be supplied 
through exports, or of reexporting from the recipient country, etc., justify the referred 
involvement. 
But at the same time the evidence suggests that overall macroeconomic 
conditions seem to be more critical at the time of an SME decision to go overseas than 
it is for TNCs. SMEs have, by definition, a reduced managerial staff and most decisions 
are taken by the owners themselves or by a couple of chief executives. The capacity of 
these people to understand and analyze a variety of data on various alternative markets 
into which to operate, is limited. Explicitly or not, countries which do not offer a 
reasonably stable macroeconomic environment tend to be eliminated as potential areas 
of investment earlier in the selection process than do those that fulfil that criteria. High 
inflation prone countries - like various in Latin America, for instance - are ceteris 
paribus less attractive for SMEs than others in which prices are more stable. 
The same can be said with regard to the stability of the policies followed with 
respect to foreign investment, foreign trade regimes, capital movements, etc. No doubt, 
that those countries that appear in the perception of SMEs as following a more erratic 
behavior at this respect, will tend to be replaced earlier in the selection process. 
Furthermore, since SMEs control more limited resources than TNCs, the risks involved 
in a foreign operation are higher. It is reasonable then for those firms to minimize those 
risks by devoting their scarce managerial, technical as well as financial resources to 
projects in "safer" recipient countries. 
It could be suggested then, that recipient developing countries who cannot in the 
short run offer a stable macroeconomic environment, should device mechanisms through 
which they would diminish, at least partially, the risks perceived by SMEs. One 
instrument is for them to sign bilateral agreements with certain developed countries 
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according to which they grant special treatment to small investors. This guarantee 
schemes if properly advertised and, if possible, backed by developed country 
institutions, could lead SMEs to take those markets seriously under consideration. One 
can envisage that the costs of these initiatives will be low given the amounts of the 
investments usually made by SMEs, and surpassed by the benefits of the mobilization 
of know-hows both for supplier as well as for recipient economies. 
Another mechanism which can be used, in this case by several developed 
countries, is to ease the effort and reduce the perceived risk of SMEs by providing them 
with the financial and technical support of specialized institutions. Particularly among 
some European countries, certain development finance organizations exist with the aim 
of helping SMEs willing to operate in developing countries. There is no doubt that the 
latter should look for ways of benefiting from their existence, a fact which, at least from 
the information gathered from this survey, is not occurring. 
But the impression commanded by this survey is quite pessimistic as to the 
influence that specific inducements can have over SMEs foreign investment decisions. 
Contrary to TNCs, which can take time and resources to negotiate a special deal with 
a host country government, SMEs are seldom in a position to afford that effort when 
its really necessary. At the same time, SMEs rarely can corne up with a project big 
enough to attract the special attention of the local government and as a result, it is not 
so easy for them to obtain a beneficial treatment from the latter. 
It is also important to recall that SMEs, including those that have already 
expanded intemationally, usually have a more limited presence overseas than TNCs. In 
other words, nowadays when a typical TNC analyzes an investment in a given 
developing country it usually has already similar ventures in various developed and 
developing countries. For an SME the probability of being in a similar situation is 
lower. In a way then, the number of alternative markets for new operations is typically 
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smaller for a TNC than for an SME, and this fact also contributes for the latter to be 
more selective. 
In addition, there is a lower ceiling for SMEs than for TNCs intemationalization. 
The former's capabilities are, by definition, more limited than the latter's, and thus they 
are constrained to operate in a smaller number of foreign countries. This fact suggests, 
again, that developing countries interested in attracting SMEs should understand clearly 
that for these firms usually many other alternative markets are available, and that they 
are frequently not in a position to spend rime and resources to alter the negative impact 
of the macroeconomic environment through a "package" of incentives specially designed 
for them. 
As indicated above, the other "type" of SME studied in this report can be 
depicted as one which has transferred its technology at the request of a recipient firm 
and which has no or a very vague strategy as regards its operations in foreign markets. 
On the one hand, the experience of these :firms indicates that the transfer of 
technology overseas does not necessarily have to follow all stages of a given sequence. 
In fact, much of the modem thinking on the intemationalization process is based on the 
notion that :firms gradually become familiar with foreign markets first through exports, 
then by opening up sales agencies abroad, followed by the celebration of licensing 
agreements and, finally, by the establishment of production joint ventures or wholly 
owned subsidiaries. At the same time, this process usually is supposed to begin with 
operations being advanced in other developed countries and only after spilling over to 
developing countries. 
This report has showed that many SMEs which were approached by recipient 
:firms had no international experience prior to transferring their know hows. In other 
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words, firms in developing countries could obtain those resources although their 
suppliers had not yet carried out a complete cycle as the one depicted in what has to 
do with the process of intemationalization. 
For developing countries the first obvious implication of what has been said is 
that they should try to look for ways of benefitting in a systematic manner from these 
sources of technology. A first step at this respect is for them to have access to data 
banks which could provide information as to SMEs which fulfil certain criteria. It is 
clear, as already stated, that not ail SMEs can be realistically considered to be potential 
suppliers. Sorne of them are too small or lack the minimum resources needed to 
participate in a foreign venture whatever the assistance they might obtain from the 
recipient itself or from other sources such as their home govemments. Thus, an 
information as the one referred would be useful only if included data on SMEs which 
controlled those resources. 
The above remark must be emphasized. In fact, as said, developing countries 
should take under consideration that the gap between the absolute total number of SMEs 
and the number of them that are in a position to transfer know hows intemationally is 
extremely large. To single out the latter firms is the challenge that any useful data bank 
has to meet. 
Sorne developed countries - such as German y, Finland, Sweden, The 
Netherlands, etc. - have organizations that provide disaggregate information on SMEs 
to interested firms in developing countries. UNIDO has also established different offices 
in several developed countries with that aim. But unfortunately these institutions seemed 
to be rarely approached by the latter. In fact, from this survey no single case of a 
recipient firm that looked for a foreign technology and finally settled an agreement with 
an SME, declared that had used their services. 
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In part this result is linked with the unawareness of developing country firms on 
the existence of those institutions. No doubt much has to be done on the part of 
developed and developing countries to disseminate among recipient firms information 
as to the services offered by those entities and the ways of approaching them. But the 
impression conveyed from the evidence is that the lack of utilization of those 
organizations has a deeper cause: the particular features of the procedure typically 
employed by developing country firms to select their suppliers of technology. 
It has been pointed out in this report, that developing country firms which 
decided to approach SMEs to acquire know hows from them, rarely undertook 
previously an extensive survey of potential suppliers. Sorne of them already were 
related with the SME through commercial links, and usually just went on to deepen that 
relationship. But in those cases in which no links existed, the selection was strongly 
based by the preference for SMEs of a given developed country or, at most, of a small 
group of developed countries. 
Cultural, historical and geographical reasons are, of course, behind this trend. 
Rarely, in fact, a recipient firm will feel the need to go ahead with an in-depth survey 
of diverse suppliers in different countries, since usually it has the knowledge and 
sometimes some persona! contacts in given developed countries. It is natural that it 
sticks to those countries - or regions of them - to select the supplier. Furthermore, 
from this survey it came out that many of the selected SMEs were world leaders in their 
respective industries and only when the preferred suppliers were not in a position of 
transferring their know hows, did recipients carry out a detailed analysis of alternatives. 
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3. The need to support recipient firms 
Different implications can be derived from what has been said. On the one hand, 
we have learned that recipients could be helped if they could approach given institutions 
which could enlarge for them their horizon of potential suppliers. In other words, 
developing country firms interested in importing technology would gain much if they 
could have access to information on the configuration of the supplier market they are 
interested in. By this procedure, these firms would probably corne to know that not 
always their initial preferences suit them best. 
On the other hand, it is probably unwise, at least at this point, not to take 
seriously as an important factor that may be crucial to allow an initiative to take off, 
the cultural and historical features of the countries involved, and particularly of the 
entrepreneurs involved. In fact, it should not be forgotten, as this study has shown, that 
SMEs and also many potential recipients in developing countries are managed by a 
limited number of persons, and that a deal among these firms - be it a licensing 
agreement or a joint venture - will be more easily settled if a good communication and 
understanding is nurtured among the persons in charge of advancing the crucial 
decisions. It is at this light that agreements of a bilateral nature between countries with 
strong cultural and historical ties, aimed at promoting entrepreneurial cooperation appear 
as a useful initiative. 
But from the point of view of developing countries, taking into account these last 
type of SMEs as potential suppliers of technology has other implications. It means 
looking at the market for know hows in a manner quite different from the one that is 
more frequent. More specifically, the implication for those countries has to do with a 
new perspective according to which, at least for a series of international transactions 
relating to technology, there is no sense in paying attention only to the supply side of 
those ventures. The characteristics and resources of the demand are as important. In 
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fact, this entails that a view of the market for technology which is a simple extension 
of the models used in economics in relation with goods or factors of production (i.e. 
capital and labor) is insufficient. 
The important point to stress here, is that to carry out certain initiatives, the 
distinction between supply and demand blurred the fact that the recipients capabilities 
to absorb the SMEs know hows were a crucial aspect for the implementation of the 
project. In other words, without their active participation those ventures would not have 
been realized. 
This view of the international transfer of technology according to which 
recipients are not seen as passive undertakings, nor mainly as importers but also as 
"active absorbers" of know hows has at least three significant consequences in terms of 
policies. First, and obvious, this vision, entails the need for developing countries to 
provide particular relevance to the building up of domestic firms capabilities, since 
without a minimum technical base those firms will not be in a position of seeking and 
assimilating foreign know hows. This report has confirmed that the familiarity with 
manufacturing techniques is a necessary requirement for a firm to be in a position of 
importing foreign know hows. Experience with at least some in-house simple R&D is 
also a factor identified as important. 
Secondly, this vision leads to a change in the policies regarding technology 
imports followed by some developing countries. In fact, although clearly much less 
popular than in the past, still some of those countries consider that to increase the 
negotiating stance of recipient fi.rms, and to reduce the costs of those imports, 
govemments have to put their attention only in regulating the modalities assumed by 
those transactions. This has been, for example, the main policy implemented by India 
in the last decade. 
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As it has been pointed out by Bell and Scott-Kemmis, this policy was based on 
the assumption that recipients had no or very limited knowledge of what they were 
importing, and suppliers were particularly interested in entering through licensing a 
large domestic market otherwise closed for them (Bell and Scott-Kemmis 1988). The 
recent empirical evidence suggests that this vision does not capture many of the 
initiatives being advanced. More so, the impression conveyed by the referred study. on 
India - as well as this one - is that in many instances it is the recipient firm the 
interested part regarding the possibility of importing a given know how and, as well, 
the one which is in a better negotiating position, particularly so when the supplier is an 
SME. 
Finally, the referred vision implies that developing country governments should 
put into practice mechanisms through which they could effectively aid their domestic 
firms in the process of searching, selecting and absorbing imported know hows. In other 
words, as in other areas of economic policy, governments should abandon their 
preference - when it is still observed - for a protecting stance, as a unique mode of 
approaching the issue of technology imports and provide more attention to the support 
of those domestic firms - particularly so those of small and medium size - which are 
interested in importing foreign know hows. 
4. Mobilizing international resources 
Many developing countries are going through a period of deep changes in what 
has to do with their economic policies. In general the new policies put forward imply, 
among other things, lowering import barriers and severely reducing public sector 
outlays. As a result of these measures, the degree of freedom to conduct industrial 
policies has been significantly reduced, since tariff protection has lost (or is in the 
process of loosing) much of its practical relevance, and governments are in no position 
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of providing incentives to given manufacturing sectors or individual investment projects 
(usually established in certain backward regions). 
It would be suggested here, that an intelligent use of the existent sources of 
technology in the world and particularly of SMEs, is an instrument to fulfil some - but 
obviously not all - of the objectives traditionally aimed at by industrial policies in 
developing countries. More specifically, there is ground to suggest that - with the 
interested help of developed countries - the former could design channels and fora 
through which domestic firms can select and meet entrepreneurs from SMEs in order 
to implement projects between them. These projects will help upgrade the ski.Ils of 
recipient firms, increase their competitiveness and, given the large export propensity of 
some SMEs as those included in this study, contribute to allow them to reach foreign 
markets with their products. 
Developing countries should design special campaigns to attract SMEs to their 
markets. These promotional efforts should be specially tailored for each developed 
country and, particularly, for each given industrial sector taking into consideration that 
usually the more salient potential suppliers have a significant participation in their 
domestic markets. These initiatives have to reach the entrepreneurs directly and the host 
country should be "advertised" in a simple and. reliable way. Again, to be effective, 
these initiatives should be based on a deep knowledge of the peculiarities and changes 
that are going on in given industrial branches of certain developed countries, in order 
to present the advantages of the potential recipient country in relation with them. 
On the part of developing countries, several beneficial features of SMEs as 
suppliers of technology can be singled out. From the fact that because of their size they 
rarely become involved in difficult or conflicting situations vis a vis host governments, 
their more flexible stance relative to TNC's with respect to the control of a venture in 
a host country, their possession ofknow hows such as those related with the production 
116 
of custom order goods which would not be easily obtained otherwise, etc. But in terms 
of this Chapter' s purpose, it is particularly appropriate to underline the finding from the 
survey according to which most SMEs had a high export propensity. This entails that, 
contrary to well diffused preconceptions, SMEs are in a position of contributing to 
transfer the capabilities needed by recipients to export. At a time of severe balance of 
payment restrictions, this possibility appears as particularly attractive for most 
developing countries. 
Anyhow, it is important to underline in dealing with this subject, that SMEs 
should not be seen always as the better option as suppliers of technology. In fact, in 
some industrial branches SMEs do control know hows that a priori are not appropriate 
for developing country conditions. Thus, the advantages, as well as the drawbacks of 
these firms should be analyzed in each case. Furthermore, it would be sad if developing 
countries would begin to confer to SMEs ail sort of positive attributes which are not 
empirically justi:fied. A naïve view according to which "small is - always -beautiful" 
in the terrain of international technology transfer, would do developing countries a great 
disservice. 
At a more concrete level of analysis, it should be recalled that usually smaller 
firms, in contrast to large firms, face more difficulties in mobilizing financial resources 
for investing in projects overseas. On the one hand, because normally they appear as 
less credit-worthy than TNCs from the point of view of banking institutions. On the 
other, because usually an investment overseas - particularly the establishment of a 
production facility - implies a much larger relative effort (in terms of its overall 
assets) for an SME than for a TNC. 
Obviously, this constraint that SMEs usually experience, is particularly sensitive 
nowadays for many developing countries which are going through severe balance of 
payments restrictions. The fact that in many instances, projects in developing countries 
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with Sl\.ffis participation require a domestic capital contribution is a feature which 
makes those firms less attractive than larger firms, which are in a position of performing 
the direct investments by themselves. 
Sorne developed countries have created financial institutions with the airn of 
supporting their home country Sl\.ffis in their overseas operations. They participate as 
a minority shareholder in the recipient firm and in this way they help the Sl\.ffi (as well 
as their developing country partners) to raise additional financial resources from the 
capital markets. Also, when needed, they provide guarantees through which those firms 
can obtain loans from commercial banks. There is no doubt that every effort that 
developed countries could put forward regarding an increase in the capitalization of 
those entities would be very helpful for the intemationalization of SMEs, and of course 
for recipient developing countries. 
The referred field is one in which international or regional public investment 
banks such as the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, The African 
Development Bank, etc., could play a role directly or - probably more appropriate -
through their affiliates which deal specifically with the financing of the private sector. 
This possibility would be clearly in the interest of developed and developing countries 
alike. 
5. Overcoming Sl\.ffis' limitations 
Small and medium sized firms from developed countries operate in a tight 
industrial network. This means that in terms of a standard input-output table, most of 
the cells in those countries are occupied. In other words, a given firm can rely strongly 
on the market since most of its requirements regarding specific parts or components can 
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be purchased through it. If needed, subcontractors can also be approached to handle the 
manufacturing of those goods which cannot be bought directly, from the "shelf'. 
When it cornes to operate in a developing country, usually some of the required 
inputs cannot be obtained so easily. Frequently they are not produced locally, and 
importing them is not always a feasible alternative. As a result, to carry out a project 
in a developing country, an SME faces severe obstacles which are not easily solved. In 
contrast with TNCs which if necessary are in a position to modify the industrial 
environment in which their affiliates operate, SMEs have not the resources nor the 
political or economic influence to put into practice a similar behavior. In other words, 
these firms are much more dependent on the overall industrial development of the host 
country. 
The referred conclusion is relevant since it points to a very important limitation 
of SMEs. In particular - and the empirical evidence supports this statement - those 
firms normally encounter serious obstacles to operate in countries with a very weak 
industrial sector. Thus, as a whole, these firms do not appear as easily available 
potential suppliers of technology, in the short and medium run, for the least developing 
countries. 
From scant evidence derived from the case study and information obtained from 
some developed country organizations devoted to the promotion of developing country 
operations of SMEs, it appears that these firms experience more frequently than TNCs 
changes in their positions in their home country markets. As a result, when this occurs, 
these firms tend to reduce their commitments in their foreign ventures. It is interesting 
to stress that those referred changes are not necessarily caused by a bad performance. 
On the contrary, given SMEs limited financial and managerial resources, it is not rare 
to verify that when a growth opportunity emerges at home these firms are not always 
capable of maintaining their presence overseas. Of course, this is a more probable 
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outcome in cases in which SMEs participate as minority shareholders in a joint venture, 
or as licensors. 
Most small and medium sized firms from developed countries have not 
participated in ventures abroad. Operations of this type are viewed as intrinsically risky 
for them. It is safe to say anyhow, that once SMEs go ahead with such projects, the 
experience gained makes them much more inclined to participate in other similar 
initiatives. Particularly if from them they are in a position of increasing their 
technological competence - for example, through learning from the recipient 
experience in using its know hows - as well as deriving income (from royalties, etc.) 
which would not have been possible otherwise. In other words, internationalization can 
be viewed also as a leaming process. 
From this perspective, the first project overseas carried out by an SME will 
necessarily imply larger relative costs than the ones that follow. From a social benefit 
point of view then, it seems reasonable to suggest that developed and developing 
countries would gain if some mechanisms were devised to put down the private costs 
of the first international involvements of SMEs. In this vein, focused "advertising" 
campaigns as the ones that were mentioned above could well be tackled by both types 
of countries with the help of some international organizations: other actions, related in 
this case with the transfer of technology as such, can also be implemented. 
SMEs technological capabilities should not be equated with SMEs technology 
transfer capabilities. The control of know hows does not assure a similar capacity to 
transmit them overseas, particularly to firms in developing countries. Given their usual 
lack of experience regarding international production operations, SMEs tend to have 
weak transfer capabilities. Engineering and consulting firms appear as useful agents that 
can help SMEs overcome these constraints. But again, the evidence from this survey 
suggests that very rarely have these firms hired their services. It is clear that much has 
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to be done to convince potential supplier firms of the need to benefit from the advice 
of specialized undertakings. Governmental efforts through which both types of firms 
may obtain the needed technical support at a reduced price may lead manufacturing 
firms to decide to approach those entities. 
In order to participate in a foreign production venture, SMEs need to perform 
a series of operations aimed at formalizing their know hows, together with dispatching 
to the host country technicians familiar with them, and/or being in a position of 
receiving recipient firm's personnel to deliver to them the relevant skills. Carrying out 
these tasks usually entails not insignificant costs for those firms, particularly when they 
have to face their first technology transfer experience. For this reason, ways of easing 
those efforts should be advanced by governments of home and host countries. There are 
probably at least two concrete mechanisms which could be used at this respect. The first 
one has to do with the assistance of certain technical organizations from industrialized 
countries to help formalize the know hows controlled by SMEs. The second one, deals 
with the need to reduce the costs associated with the training of personnel and the 
dispatching (either way) of engineers and technicians through the utilization for that 
purpose of the resources that are controlled by national and/or international 
organizations devoted to the diffusion of technical knowledge. 
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ANNEX 
MAIN PRODUCT LINES OF SAMPLE SMEs 
Country SIC Product 
Finn 
size 
Italy 2211 Wool weaves 205 
German y 2821 Foundry auxiliary resins 430 
U.S.A. 2821 Electrical isolating resins 460 
U.S.A. 2831 Biotech. (vaccines) 200 
U.S.A. 2831 Biotech. (vaccines) 350 
France 2834 Skin treatment cosmetics 460 
Italy 2834 Pharmaceutical raw materials 78 
Canada 2891 Additives for concrete 8 
U.K. 2891 Sealants and adhesives 390 
German y 2899 Chemical auxiliaries 470 
Italy 2899 Chemicals for textile industry 54 
Japan 2899 Stablizer for PV C 110 
U.S.A. 2899 Hydraulic fluids 340 
U.S.A. 2899 Microorganism control chemicals 440 
Italy 3021 Rubber soles 240 
Canada 3079 Synthetic steel strapping 50 
German y 3079 Household cleaning plastic product 80 
Italy 3079 Plastic recipients 200 
U.K. 3079 Baby feeding bottles 500 
U.S.A. 3079 Recipient fastners 350 
German y 3261 Sanitaryware in ceramics 60 
U.K. 3264 Porcelain electric insulators 450 
Canada 3411 Oil containment equipment 24 
Canada 3441 Transmission line towers 200 
Canada 3441 Transmission line towers 270 
France 3441 Heat exchangers 500 
U.S.A. 3441 Heat exchangers 300 
Italy 3442 Aluminium door accessories 180 
Japan 3452 Screws 320 
Japan 3493 Spring fastners 500 
German y 3494 Valves for ships 154 
German y 3499 Knitting & crocheting needles 300 
U.S.A. 3499 Expansion joints 250 
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Country SIC Product 
Finn 
size 
Italy 3531 Construction machinery 150 
Canada 3532 Equipment for mining & construct 75 
Canada 3532 Rock drilling equip. & tructs 500 
France 3532 Mining and forestry equipment 130 
German y 3532 Mining machinery 400 
Canada 3549 Electronic assembly soldering 250 
Canada 3549 Equipment for electrical wires 100 
France 3549 Welding guns 230 
German y 3549 Pins & piercing punches 145 
German y 3549 Special purpose machines 270 
Italy 3549 Metalworking machinery 350 
Japan 3549 Grinding machines 500 
U.S.A. 3549 Surface treatment machinery 150 
Italy 3551 Coffee machines 500 
U.K. 3552 Cotton carding machines 460 
Canada 3559 Capsule manufacture plants 100 
Canada 3559 Explosion supression systems 6 
Canada 3559 Ion exchange equipment 115 
Canada 3559 Metal refining equipment 300 
Canada 3559 Oil & gas process equipment 55 
Canada 3559 Oilfield equipment 35 
Canada 3559 Tyre retrading machines 55 
France 3559 Special shock absorbers 330 
German y 3559 Machine tools for circuit boards 135 
Italy 3559 Ceramic ind. prosses 200 
Italy 3559 Packaging machines 180 
Italy 3559 Plants for chemical industries 500 
Italy 3559 Rubber induStry machinery 100 
U.K. 3559 Pulverizers 24 
German y 3561 Pumps 430 
Canada 3563 High pressure air compressors 7 
Canada 3567 Industrial furnaces 45 
German y 3567 Industrial furnaces 400 
Italy 3567 Industrial furnaces 350 
U.S.A. 3567 Industrial furnaces 150 
U.S.A. 3567 Mining & petrochemical equipment 500 
U.S.A. 3567 Oil burners & furnaces 175 
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Country SIC Product 
Finn 
size 
U.K. 3569 Cranes 115 
U.K. 3569 Material handling equipment 50 
Canada 3573 Electronic equipment for computers 85 
Canada 3573 Video display terminals 364 
Canada 3573 Videotext, teletext, videodisc 29 
U.S.A. 3573 Computers 250 
Canada 3585 Refrigeration equipment 150 
U.S.A. 3585 Refrigeration equipment 300 
Canada 3612 Electrical distrib. equipment 500 
Italy 3612 Electrical distrib. equipment 80 
U.K. 3612 Electric power generators 401 
Italy 3613 Electrical switches 15 
U.K. 3629 Industrial batteries 300 
Italy 3631 Household cooking equipment 500 
Canada 3643 Copper foil for printed circuits 12 
France 3648 Lighting equipment accessories 360 
Canada 3662 Radio telephone equipment 340 
Canada 3662 Telecommunication systems 250 
Japan 3679 Switches & keyboards 350 
U.S.A. 3679 Rectifiers & printed circuits 40 
German y 3699 Resistors 77 
Canada 3714 Radiators 14 
France 3714 Pumps for automobiles 150 
U.K. 3714 Gear boxes 200 
U.K. 3714 Metal car components 400 
U.K. 3714 Thermostats for motor cars 80 
Japan 3743 Electric equipment for railroads 400 
U.K. 3811 Non destructive testing equipment 21 
Italy 3824 Fluid meters 75 
U.K. 3824 Meters for liquids 90 
France 3829 Temperature and pressure sensors 80 
U.K. 3829 Switches & pressure indicators 120 
U.S.A. 3829 Measuring instruments 350 
U.S.A. 3829 RFI control instruments 120 
Japan 3832 Special cinematography products 170 
U.S.A. 3832 lnfrared viewers, optical devices 25 
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